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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is confronted by the uncertainty or risk which 
comes from a lack of knowledge as to what the state of the 
world is going to be. Knight has differentiated between 
uncertainty and risk: risk if the individual feels able to 
attach probabilities to the various possible states of the 
world, uncertainty if the individual feels unable to do so. 
However, many economists use uncertainty and risk 
interchangeably. The fact that uncertainty or risk affects the 
actions and decisions of economic agents makes it an important 
topic for economic analysis. One way to manage this risk is 
the introduction of instruments such as futures contracts and 
option contracts to the market. Such contracts allow 
individuals to trade away or reduce uncertainty in return for 
a market price. 
Increased trading activities and expanding markets in 
recent years and related economic or political shocks have 
created higher and more volatile prices resulting in greater 
uncertainty in decision making. This environment has led to an 
increased interest in the use of futures markets. Many markets 
are now much more international in nature than just a decade 
ago. 
Foreign currencies have become some of the most actively 
traded commodities in the world and their markets promise to 
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grow in the foreseeable future. The power behind this 
activity, of course, is the growth of international trade and 
investment. Since the break down of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime in the early 1970s, foreign exchange 
rates have fluctuated wildly. So exchange rate risk has become 
an important issue for management of firms with international 
transactions. Commodity traders have been simultaneously 
confronted with increased price and exchange rate risk as they 
have engaged in international commodity trading. Consequently, 
commodity futures and currency futures markets or currency 
forward markets have rapidly developed and actively utilized 
in recent years as a way of efficiently coping with exchange 
rate and price risks. 
A futures contract, which is a legally binding commitment 
to make or take delivery at a later date, of a fixed amount of 
a specific grade or quality of a commodity at a specific 
price, is used by hedgers to manage risk, and by speculators 
and arbitragers to earn trading profits. Futures trading 
serves a number of important functions vital to the health of 
a market economy through the role of hedgers, speculators and 
arbitragers. Two of the major economic functions of futures 
markets are risk-shifting and price discovery. Risk shifting, 
which is. known as hedging, is the major economic justification 
for futures markets. It is the act of taking a position in the 
futures market that is opposite to one's cash market position 
to protect the cash position against loss due to price 
fluctuations. Secondly, the futures price for a commodity 
represents most information about the future cash price. If 
this price serves as a signal to guide production, 
consumption, and financing decisions, it follows that the 
resultant allocation of resources will be more efficient than 
would be the case in the absence of markets where this 
information is made known. This price discovery role is a 
side benefit of futures trading. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the 
competitive firm's behavior under the price and exchange rate 
uncertainty when the firm participates in futures markets to 
hedge against these risks. In the present study, firms are 
assumed to buy or sell the product domestically, produce the 
product as well as export or import the product from abroad. 
This study will provide some insight into the risk shifting 
role of futures markets and marketing strategy between 
domestic and foreign markets when there is both commodity 
price and exchange rate uncertainty. Also the firm's behavior 
is analyzed when basis risk, which is random fluctuations in 
the difference between the cash market price and the futures 
contract price at a specified date, is introduced to the 
model. 
The volume of trade in forward markets has a significant 
level of activity relative to that in the futures markets. The 
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kinds of commodities which are actively traded on both forward 
and futures markets are generally international commodities 
(Paroush and Wolf). There are differences in analyzing the 
model depending upon whether traders export directly or export 
forward. Therefore, this dissertation will examine the hedging 
and production rules for the firm which exports forward and 
supplies output in the domestic market under price, exchange 
rate, and basis risk. 
Many offshore traders use the U.S. futures markets as a 
risk management tool. Offshore hedgers are usually confronted 
with price and exchange rate risk. Exchange rate risk is 
important to offshore decision makers in that currency values 
can change between the time a futures contract is placed and 
the time the hedge is lifted. Additionally they face basis 
risk because trading commodities are not deliverable against 
contracts specified on futures exchanges or the delivery date 
of the futures contract does not coincide with the importing 
or exporting date of the output. Therefore, the offshore 
firm's behavior is analyzed under exchange rate and basis risk 
when they use the U.S. futures markets as a risk-management 
tool. 
The empirical section will study an offshore firm as 
represented by a Korean importing firm. When a Korean firm 
imports products as inputs for final goods, it usually faces 
commodity price and exchange rate uncertainties. This 
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importing firm's concern is how it could import products with 
less price uncertainty. The way to do is to use U.S. commodity 
futures market. In Korea the forward exchange rate market is 
well developed, but futures markets do not exist. Korean 
importing firms usually import agricultural products such as 
corn, soybeans and wheat from the U.S. because these 
commodities are little produced or not produced in Korea. This 
type of agricultural product has severe price fluctuations 
relative to industrial products because of production 
uncertainty. These products are used as inputs for the 
production of final goods. Because of that, uncertainty in 
these input prices may make the supply and price of final 
goods uncertain. The management of commodity price risk by 
using futures markets could increase the social benefit of 
Korea. The purpose of the empirical study is to show with real 
data how futures markets and forward markets hedge a price and 
exchange rate risk, and what is the optimal hedge ratio. To do 
the empirical work, we choose corn as example. 
This dissertation considers the three kinds of firm. The 
first firm buys or sells the product domestically, produces 
the product as well as export or import the product from 
abroad. The second firm is different from the first firm in 
that it exports or imports by forward contracts which are 
certain. The third firm is the importing firm in offshore 
country. Generally the purpose of this dissertation is to 
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analyze the behavior of above firms under the price and 
exchange rate uncertainties when futures markets or forward 
markets are available. 
To accomplish the objectives, we will use following 
methods. First, we set up the model in an expected utility 
frame work. Second, we solve the model using Stein's theorem 
and the Kuhn Tucker condition method, and interpret the 
results. Finally, in the empirical study, a unit root test is 
used to test whether the stationary condition for each series 
is satisfied or not. We must use the series satisfied the 
stationary condition in order to do empirical work or get 
variance, covariance and correlation coefficients. 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. A literature 
review on futures markets is given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
considers a general producing and trading firm's behavior in 
international trade with futures markets in the commodity and 
currency under price and exchange rate uncertainty. The first 
section is an introduction while the second and third 
sections involve a model with complete markets or incomplete 
markets, respectively. Subsequent sections reexamine the above 
model by adding basis risk. 
In Chapter 4, a model is considered for a general 
producing and trading firm with a futures market in the 
commodity and currency under basis and exchange rate 
uncertainty. However, the firm's behavior is different in that 
7 
the firm exports or imports by forward contract. 
Chapter 5 deals with the importing firm's behavior in 
offshore markets when a commodity futures market and a 
currency forward market is available. Chapter 6 is an 
empirical study of optimal hedging behavior in offshore 
markets by the importing firm considered in Chapter 5. Chapter 
7 presents a short summary of the results and conclusions. 
8 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mckinnon (1967) is the first to consider hedging from the 
point of view of primary or agricultural producers. He 
distinguishes the farmer from the grain merchant holding 
inventories in that the farmer faces his own output 
uncertainty as well as output price uncertainty, but the grain 
merchant has only the latter problem. He shows how hedging can 
minimize risk under the conditions of both price and 
production uncertainty. However, in his model, planned 
production is not a decision variable, which is in contrast to 
the standard firm theory. He also adds the further income 
stabilizing possibility of buffer stocks. He concludes that 
hedging is an effective method in managing risk and that 
buffer stocks can be used to moderate production variability. 
Holthausen (1979) incorporates forward-futures trading 
opportunities into the theory of the firm making decisions 
under the conditions of uncertainty. His major finding is that 
the firm which does not face production uncertainty will 
produce a level of output which depends only on the forward 
price and is, in particular, independent of the firm's degree 
of risk aversion and the probability distribution of the 
uncertain price. This phenomenon of independence of production 
and hedging or production and risk aversion is called 
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separation. Also, if firms are characterized by nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion, the optimal hedge increases as the 
riskiness of the price uncertainty increases. He adds two 
additional results that more risk averse decision makers make 
larger hedges and that the existence of a forward-futures 
market results in a large output due to risk response. 
Similary, Feder, Just and Schmitz (FJS) (1980) examine 
the behavior of a competitive firm under price uncertainty 
where a futures market exists for the commodity produced by 
the firm. They find that the level of output is determined 
independently from the future spot price's probability 
distribution when futures market trading is allowed. The 
production decision is solely a function of the forward-
futures price and costs of production. That is, with the 
presence of a futures market, a complete separation is 
maintained between the production decision and the futures 
trading decisions. The subjective distribution of futures spot 
price affects only the firm's involvement in futures trading. 
Conditions are then determined under which a firm will either 
hedge, speculate by buying futures contracts, or speculate by 
selling futures contracts. They indicate the important social 
benefit derived from the existence of a futures market because 
introducing futures markets will eliminate output 
fluctuations. However, in Holthausen and FJS, if production 
uncertainty or basis risk is introduced to their model, the 
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separation between production and hedging decision does not 
hold. 
Batlin (1983) explores a model of a producer who faces 
output price uncertainty with imperfect time hedging 
opportunities in the futures market. That is, he extends 
Holthausen and FJS's model by adding basis risk. He 
demonstrates that the separation theorem between production 
and hedging doesn't hold except in the very special case of a 
perfect time hedge (i.e., the delivery date of the futures 
contract coincides with the marketing date of the output). 
Moreover, hedging actually exacerbates the effects that price 
expectations, risk, and risk aversion would have had on output 
in the absence of futures markets. He shows that higher 
expectations about future spot price risk generally reduce the 
level of forward sales, and a higher correlation between spot 
and futures price changes generally induces higher levels of 
output and short hedging in comparative static results. 
Grant (1985) examines expected utility maximizing farmers 
facing just price or both price risk and quantity risk. A 
farmer facing joint price and output uncertainty behaves in a 
similar fasion to one confronting only price uncertainty when 
there is no chance to participate in forward trading. However, 
when forward markets exist, farmers behave differently 
depending upon whether they confront price risk only or joint 
price and quantity risk. If there is only price uncertainty. 
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the risk associated with the farmer's production can be 
eliminated completely through forward trading, and the 
separation theorem holds. When both price and quantity 
uncertainty are present, forward contracting will not 
eliminate all risk and the separation theorem does not hold. 
An optimal level of production and an optimal forward position 
depend upon the joint distribution of price and quantity and 
upon the farmer's degree of risk aversion. These relationships 
can be identified for special cases. Grant argues that these 
cases should be examined empirically in future research. 
Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (BEZ) (1985) derive optimal 
hedging and production rules for an exporting firm which faces 
both commodity-price and foreign exchange rate uncertainty. In 
their model, the hedging problem for an exporting firm differs 
from that generally considered in the literature because the 
exporting firm faces two tiers of uncertainty. When unbiased 
forward (or futures) markets for the commodity produced by the 
firm and for the foreign currency jointly exist, and when the 
two markets are independent, then optimization by the firm 
implies full hedging in both markets. The size of the 
commodity hedge is independent of the properties of the 
foreign exchange markets. However, the optimal foreign 
exchange hedge depends on the commodity hedge and the 
properties of the commodity forward markets. In addition if 
both forward markets exist, the firm's optimal production 
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level is independent of the firm's degree of risk aversion and 
the probability distribution of the uncertain prices. The 
effect of the absence of one or both of the forward markets on 
production depends on the consumption beta (a covariance term 
between the marginal utility of wealth and random prices, 
which expresses the riskiness of the unhedgeable risks) of the 
unhedgeable risks. 
Kawai and Zilcha (KZ) (1986) examine the optimum behavior 
of a risk-averse international trading firm under exchange 
rate and commodity price uncertainties when forward exchange 
and commodity futures contracts are available. First they 
verify the Separation Theorem and the Full Double Hedging 
Theorem. The Separation Theorem states that the optimum output 
supply (for export) or input demand (for import) of the 
commodity is determined only by the trader's production 
technology and the product of the forward exchange rate and 
the commodity futures prices. Attitudes toward risk and the 
stochastic nature of the random variables determine the 
trader's involvements in forward foreign exchange and 
commodity futures. The Full Double Hedging Theorem states 
that the optimal policy is a perfect (full) hedge in the 
commodity and currency markets. The paper proves that the 
joint unbiasedness of the forward foreign exchange and 
commodity futures markets is sufficient for full double 
hedging to be optimal. Second, they investigate the 
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implications of the existence of both a forward foreign 
exchange rate market and a commodity futures markets in 
comparison to the case where only one (or no) market is 
available to the firm. 
The introducing of a missing market(s) that satisfies 
joint unbiasedness will unambiguously increase the level of 
export. When the markets are biased against the exporter in 
the sense that he must pay a risk premium, the chance of 
securing a favorable effect (i.e., increased production for 
export) by establishing an additional market will be 
diminished, but remains high as long as the bias (or risk 
premium) is not too large. It is also demonstrated that making 
separately unbiased markets available does not automatically 
stimulate the level of international trade. In their model, if 
production uncertainty or basis risk is included (that is, 
more general, and actual) optimality conditions must be 
modified and are more complicated. In such a case, even a full 
double hedge will not diversify away risk all together. In BEG 
and KZ if basis risk is considered, then the separation 
theorem does not hold. 
Thompson and Bond (1987) examine the optimal hedging 
behavior of offshore commodity traders under uncertainty of 
commodity prices and exchange rates. First, the standard 
commodity hedging framework is extended to incorporate 
exchange rate uncertainty, and second, to forward cover 
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transactions in the foreign exchange market, which offers the 
opportunity to reduce currency risk. The theoretical 
derivations indicate that exchange rate risk may affect 
commodity hedging decisions in situations where exchange rates 
and commodity prices are perceived to interact with one 
another over time. Also, the theory suggests that the extent 
of utilization of U.S. futures markets by offshore traders is 
influenced in part by their strategies for coping with 
exchange rate uncertainty. Examination of these theoretical 
propositions for Australian and U.S. wheat traders making 
hedging decisions on the Chicago futures exchange confirms 
that the magnitude of exchange rate effects can be 
substantial. 
Fung and Lai (1991) develop a model under the assumption 
of stochastic prices to explain different hedging behaviors of 
a multinational firm. The hedging decision rules depend on the 
covarlability of the uncertain export earnings (output price) 
and the exchange rate for the exporting (importing) firm. 
Furthermore, the production decision is no longer separable 
from exchange rate risk (that is, the separation theorem 
breaks down). They show that speculative activity in the 
forward market has a positive interaction with the level of 
export, and exchange rate uncertainty has a substantial impact 
on exports. That is, if the correlation coefficient between 
price and exchange rate, r, is non-negative, then the exchange 
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rate risk will have an adverse effect on trade. However, if r 
is very negative, the firm tends to increase its exports 
because the uncertain exchange rate risk helps the 
multinational firm reduce its total risk. Similar properties 
are also shown to hold for firms that import an input from 
abroad and are faced with both output price and exchange rate 
uncertainty. 
Zilch and Eldor (1991) consider a model with a 
competitive risk-averse exporting firm who faces uncertain 
exchange rates in a multiperiod analysis. The capital stock 
(or fixed input) has to be determined at the outset while the 
variable input (labor) is chosen optimally at the beginning of 
each period, but before the realization of the exchange rate. 
The widely recognized separation result does not hold in their 
model even though the production function is deterministic. 
They show that introducing unbiased currency forward markets 
decreases the capital/labor ratio in all periods, and compared 
to the one-period case such a firm tends to overhedge, which 
is considered as a hedge against uncertain returns in the 
second period. This has some policy implications. For example, 
in the U.S. for tax purposes, one is considered as a 
speculator if one sells short in the forward market but is not 
long in the commodity (currency) itself. Their result shows 
that selling forward more than one's output (or its value) may 
stem from hedging purposes in a many-period model. In some 
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cases the introduction of unbiased forward markets results in 
higher investments and production in all dates. 
In Mckinnon, Holthausen, FJS, Batlin and Grant the firm 
produces only for domestic use, and in BEZ, KZ, TB, FL and ZE 
the firm produces only for export. The above models do not 
consider a competitive firm which produces for export and 
domestic use in two-period framework. Many firms sell their 
products in both domestic and foreign markets. They also buy 
and sell in different market. The model of this dissertation 
will consider simultaneously domestic and foreign commodity 
markets and firm which can sell and buy in both markets. For 
example, when the foreign price is expected to be very high, 
if the firm can buy its product in the domestic market and 
sell to the foreign market, then the firm can obtain more 
profits. Therefore, this model is more general and provides 
some insight into the hedging role of futures markets on 
production and marketing strategy between domestic and foreign 
markets. 
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CHAPTER 3. A MODEL OF A PRODUCING AND TRADING FIRM FACING 
PRICE UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
3.1. Introduction 
The basic model considers the problem of a competitive, 
risk-averse firm which produces for export and domestic use in 
a two-period framework. The firm can also buy and sell in both 
domestic and foreign markets. The firm faces three kinds of 
uncertainty. First, the spot foreign exchange rate is a random 
variable r. Second, the domestic price of the commodity is a 
random variable p. Third, the firm faces a random variable s 
which is the foreign price of the commodity in the foreign 
currency. For simplicity we assume that the firm does not face 
other types of uncertainties, is a price taker and has 
identified the subjective probability distribution of all 
random variables. The firm has a Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function U(7r) with the properties U'(tt) > 0 and 
U" (TT) < 0, and a cost function C(Q) with C'(Q) > 0 and 
C" (Q) > 0, and maximizes the expected utility of its 
domestic-currency profits. The firm has access to both 
foreign exchange futures and commodity futures contracting in 
the domestic currency. We call this the case of complete 
markets, while the situation where the firm does not have 
access to both contracting opportunities is called the case of 
incomplete markets. 
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3.2. The complete market model 
In complete markets, the firm's profits in domestic 
currency units can be expressed as 
TT = rs Qp + p Qp - C(Qp+Qo) - K Qp + (F - p )Z + (R -r )X 
where a tilde ( ) denotes a random variable, and IT, r, p and 
s are always random variables even when there is no tilde. The 
following notation is used: 
r= spot foreign exchange rate in period (t+1) 
s= the foreign price of the commodity in foreign currency in 
period (t+1) 
Qp= quantity exported (if Qp > 0) or imported (if Qp < 0) 
in period (t+1) 
p= domestic price in period (t+1) 
Qj,= quantity sold (if Qp > 0) or purchased (if < 0) 
in domestic market in period (t+1) 
\ 
C(Qp+Qo)= cost function with C'(Q)>0 and C" (Q) > 0 
K= transaction cost (include transportation cost) of foreign 
trading per unit 
F= futures price in t for delivery in period (t+1) (certain) 
Z= the amount of the commodity sold (if Z > 0) or 
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purchased (if Z < 0) in the futures market 
R= foreign exchange futures price in period t (certain) 
r= foreign exchange futures price in period (t+1) 
X= the amount of foreign exchange sold (if X>0) or purchased 
(if X<0) in the futures market. 
There are four decision variables: Qp, Qp, Z and X, and 
three sources of uncertainty: r, s and p. While the efficient 
market hypothesis would imply that rs and p should be 
related, they are viewed in a general fashion at this point. 
Also notice that the producer can choose to purchase in one 
market and sell in the other market depending on relative 
prices. The cost function is defined over net production and 
does not include the cost of transportation and storage. Thus, 
for example, if Qp = -100, and = 200, the cost function is 
defined for the net production and sales of 100. If the firm 
is an international commodity trading company without 
production, then C(Q) must be interpreted in a different 
fashion to represent the cost of purchasing, storing and 
transporting the commodity. 
The optimization problem is 
Max EU(7r) 
Qp / Qq / Z, X 
S.t TT = r^Qp + p Qo - C(Qp+Qg) - K Qp + (F-p) Z + (R-r)X 
There are four possible cases to be considered as far as 
20 
trade restrictions. 
1. Qp and Qp unrestricted 
2. Qp > 0 and Qp unrestricted (no foreign purchase) 
3. Qp unrestricted and Qp > 0 (no domestic purchase) 
4. Qp > 0 and Qp > 0 (no purchasing) 
3.2.1. Case 1. Qp and Qp are unrestricted 
In this case the competitive firm can export or import 
its output as well as sell or buy in domestic markets. 
The first order conditions for an optimum are 
E[U' (IT) (rs - C - K) ] 
E[U' (TT) (p - C')] = 0 
E [ U '  ( T T )  ( F  -  p )  ]  = 0  
E[U' (TT) (R - r) ] =0 
= 0 (3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Equation (1.2) can be rearranged to obtain 
E[U'(?) p] = E[U'(7r) C] 
Equation (1.3) can be rearranged to obtain 
E[U' (TT) F] = E[U' (TT) p] 
Combining these expressions gives 
F = C'(Q) (3.5) 
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Since F and C (Q) are nonstochastic. 
Under the condition of complete markets, the firm's 
production is given by equation (3.5). That is, the firm's 
output level is chosen at a point where marginal cost (C) is 
equal to the certain futures price. Hence the production 
decision does not depend on the utility function (i.e., the 
degree of risk aversion) or the probability distribution of 
the random variables. The intuition behind this result is that 
when production is not stochastic, the existence of both 
futures markets completely eliminates all risks for the firm 
since it can buy and sell freely in either market. This 
separation theorem was first proved by Danthine (1978) for a 
competitive firm [see also Kawai and Zilcha(1986)]. Its 
extension to our model demonstrates that the separation 
theorem still holds when the firm produces for export and 
domestic use under price and exchange rate uncertainty as long 
as it can freely trade in both markets. If commodity futures 
markets are highly competitive, we might expect F to be close 
to Ep (unbiasedness). Under this unbiasedness assumption, the 
risk averse firm will produce amounts close to the output 
levels that would be optimal if Ep were certain to occur. 
To gain intuition about why production is always decided 
at the point that F = C(Q) under the condition of complete 
markets, suppose the expected foreign price is very high 
relative to the expected domestic price. The firm would choose 
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to purchase the commodity in the domestic market and sell it 
at the higher foreign price. The transaction levels would be 
determined by the relative prices, risk characteristic and the 
probability distributions of random variables. Given the 
opportunity to purchase the commodity domestically, the firm 
may not choose to produce at all. If the firm does produce, 
production will be equal to the excess of Qp over (-Q^) . This 
amount can be perfectly hedged on the domestic market given 
the standard separation result. Or consider the case where the 
expected domestic price is high relative to the expected 
foreign price. The firm may choose not to produce for the 
foreign market but rather purchase the commodity in the 
foreign market. In the domestic market it will produce enough 
to supply the excess of Qp over (-Qp) . This amount can be 
hedged using the domestic futures market, and separation 
holds. Therefore, in any cases, separation holds. 
If we use the relation that when two random variables (X 
and Y) are not independent, E(XY) = EX EY + cov(X,Y), then we 
can get the following equations by rewriting equations (3.1), 
(3.3) and (3.4) 
E[U'(7r)(C'+ K) ] = EU'(7r) E(rs) + cov(U'(f), rs) 
EU'(n) F = EU'(f) Ep + cov(U'(y), p) 
EU'(n) R = EU'(f) Er + cov(U'(7r), r) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
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Combining equation (3.6) with (3.5) gives 
F = Ers - K + cov(U'(7r), rs) / EU'(tt) (3.9) 
Equation (3.7) can be used to obtain 
F = Ep + cov(U'(F), p) / EU'(7r) (3.10) 
Equation (3.9) and (3.10) can be used to give meaning to the 
idea of the certainty equivalent. The relationships between 
the certainty equivalent, the expected risky return, and the 
risk premium are expressed as follows: 
Certainty Equivalent = Expected Risky Return - Risk Premium 
In this model, the expected prices will not lead to the same 
level of production as F since they differ by the covariance 
term. 
Consider now some assumptions about the price 
distributions. Assume that p and r are statistically 
independent. This assumes independence between domestic prices 
and the exchange rate. Then cov(p, r) = 0. Stein's theorem 
(1973), derived independently by Rubinstein (1976) states that 
if two random variable X and Y are jointly normally 
distributed, and g is a differentiable function, then 
cov(g(X), Y) = E[g'(X)] cov(X, Y). Stein's theorem is 
especially useful in expected utility models in which 
covariance terms between marginal utility of profit and random 
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variables appear in the profit equation. Applying the theorem 
to the covariance terms in the equations (3.6), (3.7) and 
(3.8) leads to the following expressions. 
cov(U'(7r), rs) = EU" (tt) cov(7r, rs) 
= EU''(f) [Qp var(rs)+ cov(rs,p) 
- Z cov(rs, p) - X cov(rs,r)] (3.11) 
cov(U'(7r), p) = EU" (tt) cov(7r, p) 
= EU" (TT) [Qp cov(rs,p) + var(p)- Z var(p)] 
(3.12) 
cov(U'(7r), r ) = EU" (TT) [Qp cov(rs,r) - X var(r) ] (3.13) 
where E(.), var(.) and cov(.) are the expectation, variance 
and covariance operators. Substituting (3.11), (3.12) and 
(3.13) into (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), and dividing by EU'(TT) 
gives the following expression 
E(rs) - C - K = A [Qp var(rs) + Q^ cov(rs, p) -
Z cov(rs, p) - X cov(rs, r)] (3.14) 
Ep - F = A [ Qp cov(rs, p) + QQ var(p) - Z var(p)] (3.15) 
Er - R = A [ Qp cov(rs, r) - X var(r)] (3.16) 
where -[EU" (TT) ]/[EU' (TT) ] S A > 0 represents the producer's 
Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If futures 
markets are considered unbiased (i.e., F = Ep and R = Er), 
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then the equation (3.15) and (3.16) will give 
Z = Qo + Qf cov(rs, p) / var(p) 
X = Qp [ cov(rs, r) / var(r) ] 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
Substituting (3.17) and (3.18) into (3.14) yields 
{Eïë - Jg- - F] (3.19) 
\vax{rs) [1-plgp - plgr] 
where = cov^(rs, p) / var(rs) var(p) 
P^psr = cov2(rs, r) / var(rs) var(r) . 
Here var(rs) [l- - p^^^^ ] = var(s) [Er^ - r^ p^^p] > 0 
because Er^ - r^ = var(r) and 0 < p^^p < 1. 
Furthermore, var(rs) = r^ var(s) + s^ var(r) + var(r) var(s) 
= s^ var(r) + Er^ var(s) . 
We can get Qp* from equations (3.5) and (3.19) since Q=Qp+Qp 
Equation (3.17) indicates the optimal hedge. The hedging 
behavior of the firm will depend on its attitude toward risk 
and the distribution of random variables. If Qp* = 0, the firm 
can hedge perfectly against the price risk. When Qp* > 0, 
whether there is overhedging or underhedging depends on the 
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ratio between cov(rs, p) and var(p). Usually under the 
assumption of unbiasedness and no basis risk, the firm will 
hedge its entire output. However, in this model (when both 
foreign and domestic markets are considered) the firm will not 
hedge its entire output even with unbiasedness and no basis 
risk since the price uncertainty is multiplied by the exchange 
rate uncertainty. That is, the firm may overhedge or 
underhedge even with the unbiasedness and no basis risk 
assumptions. 
Equation (3.19) represents the optimal export or import 
quantity. Although the firm hedges using commodity and 
currency futures contracts, there is a still uncertainty in 
exporting or importing decision because the firm's exporting 
or importing decision is affected by the distribution of 
random variables and risk attitude. Hence in determining the 
absolute level of export or import, the firm takes into 
account its attitude toward risk, the probability distribution 
of random variables and correlations between random variables. 
When the net expected foreign price in terms of domestic 
currency unit (Ers- K) is greater than the futures contract 
price (F) or marginal cost (C) the firm exports its output in 
foreign market. If (Ers-K) < F then the firm doesn't export. 
If the net expected foreign price equals the certain futures 
contract price, the firm will want to sell all its output in 
the domestic market and not import any units. This is because 
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there is no uncertainty in the domestic market due to the 
perfect hedge available in the domestic market. However, if 
(Ers- K) < F, then the firm will import the product and sell 
it in the domestic market and in this case the optimal hedge: 
Z = Qj, - Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p) . Therefore, only when there is a 
benefit covering the uncertainty in foreign market will the 
firm want to sell its output in the foreign market. 
Consider now another case. If the expected foreign price 
is greater than the expected domestic price, then < 0 and 
Qp > 0 with no restrictions on and Qp. If the firm wants to 
hedge the price risks of its output, then the firm buys 
commodity futures contracts (-Qp) in order to hedge the price 
risk for purchasing Q^ in the domestic market and sells 
commodity futures contracts (Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p)) in order to 
hedge the foreign price risk for exporting Qp in the foreign 
market, and simultaneously sells currency futures contracts 
(Es Qp) in order to hedge the exchange risk for exporting Qp. 
Then the optimal amount of futures contracts: 
Z = -Qjj + Qp cov(rs,f)/var(p) 
Equation (3.18) representing the optimal currency futures 
position can be expressed as 
X E(s) Qp* (3.20) 
28 
because cov(rs, r) = E(s) var(r) due to cov(r, s) = 0 
Then we say that the firm fully hedges in the currency market; 
namely, it sells all its foreign exchange proceeds. 
Now suppose that the commodity futures price incorporates 
a risk premium, so that F < Ep. Then cov(U'(7r), p) in equation 
(3.7) must be negative since EU'(tt) > 0. In order for the 
covariance to be negative, the value of U' must decline when p 
rises, which (since U is concave) means that IT must rise when 
p rises. The right hand side term in equation (3.10) must be 
negative. That is, 
EU" (TT) [ Qp cov(rs, p) + Qg var(p) - Z var(p)] < 0 
Then we can get 
Z < Qo + Qp cov(rs, p) / var(p) 
If the commodity futures price incorporate a risk premium the 
firm hedges less than in the case of unbiasedness. 
Suppose that the exchange rate futures market 
incorporates a risk premium, so that R < Er. Then 
cov(U'(7r), r) in equation (3.8) must be negative. From 
equation (3.11) 
EU" (tt) [ Qp cov(rs, r) - X var(r)] < 0 
X < Qp cov(rs, r) / var(r) 
or X < Es Qp 
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Therefore 
X < Es Qp iff R < Er 
That is, if the exchange futures market incorporates a risk 
premium, the firm hedges less than in the case of unbiasedness 
in the currency futures market since risk premium is 
considered as a hedging cost. Hence, we can imagine that there 
will be underhedging under normal backwardation (the futures 
price is below the expected spot price) and overhedging under 
contango (the futures price exceeds the expected spot price). 
3.2.2. Case 2. > 0 and is unrestricted 
Consider the case of the restrictions on imports but no 
restrictions on domestic sales Q^. There are three possible 
scenarios. 
i) First, a firm sells its output both domestically and 
abroad when the expected foreign price and the expected 
domestic price are competitive. 
ii) Second, when the expected foreign price is relatively 
higher than the expected domestic price, the firm buys 
its output in domestic market and sells it in foreign 
market. That is, all product produced and bought in 
domestic market is sold in foreign market. 
iii) Third, when the expected domestic price is relatively 
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higher than the expected foreign price, the firm sells 
all output domestically produced in the domestic market 
because of the restriction on imports. Here we can 
imagine that tariff restrictions make imports 
impossible. Therefore, the first and second scenarios 
are not actually restricted but the third is restricted. 
The need for inequality constraints requires the use of 
Kuhn-Tucker condition for solving the problem. The restriction 
on Qp (>0) changes equation (3.1) to the inequality condition. 
E[U'(7r)(rs - C- K)] < 0 and [8EU(;r)/6Qp] Q, = 0 (3.1') 
Equation (3.2) (3.3) and (3»4) are the same as before. 
i) In this restricted form if Qp > 0, all results are the 
same as the unrestricted case because E[U'(tt) (rs-C'-K) ]=0. 
That is, the firm sells its output both domestically and 
abroad because the expected foreign price and the expected 
domestic price are competitive. So the first scenario is 
included in this case. 
ii) If Qp > 0 and Q^ is unrestricted, the inequality first 
order condition is changed to the equality condition. Because 
Qp> 0 means that the expected foreign price is greater than 
the expected domestic price, the second scenario is also 
included in this case. 
iii) If Qp = 0, implying that the restriction is binding and 
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there may be an incentive to import, equation (3.1') reduces 
to the following 
Ers - K - F + cov(U'(7r), rs) / EU'(tt) < 0 
using the fact that 
E(U'(7r) rs) = EU'(7r)E rs + cov(U'(7r), rs) 
and F = C (Q) . 
If Qp is zero, then the above expression could be 
strictly negative which would imply that decreasing Qp (below 
zero) would raise profits. For example, if the producer could 
buy cheap foreign goods ((Ers -K) < F) expected utility would 
be higher. Given the constraint, however, he can only sell in 
the foreign market. Given no incentive to do so, separation 
still holds since equations (3.2) and (3.3) imply 
F = C'(Q) 
and Q ~ = Z 
Therefore, the firm's production is still decided at the point 
that F = C(Q). The firm doesn't export its output and sells 
its entire output in domestic market. It also hedges its 
entire output. This occures because the domestic market can be 
perfectly hedged. 
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3.2.3. Case 3. Qp is unrestricted and > 0 
In this part we consider that the case when the firm can 
not buy in the domestic market but can buy or sell in the 
foreign market. The restriction is in the domestic market but 
not in the foreign market. If domestic market conditions are 
favorable, the firm's domestic supply will be greater than 
zero, but if conditions are not favorable domestic supply will 
be zero. In case 3 there are three possible scenarios. 
i) First, when the expected foreign price and expected 
domestic price are competitive the firm sells its output 
in the domestic and foreign market. This is exactly the 
same as the first scenario in case 2. 
ii) Second, when the expected domestic price is relatively 
higher than the expected foreign price, the firm buys 
its output in foreign market and sells it in domestic 
market. That is, all product produced domestically 
and bought in the foreign market is sold in the domestic 
market. 
iii) Third, when the expected foreign price is relatively 
higher than the expected domestic price, the firm sells 
all output produced in domestic market to the foreign 
market but can not buy output in domestic market due to 
some restrictions. 
It is difficult to imagine the third scenario in the real 
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world. Possible cases might be a large rice producer who only 
exports the product, or a high expected domestic transaction 
cost due to some expected strikes. Equation (3.2) is changed 
as following due to a restriction on 
E[U'(r)(p - C'(Q))] < 0 and [8EU(f)/8Qo] = 0 (3.2') 
Equation (3.1) (3.3) and (3.4) are same. 
i) If domestic supply is greater than zero, then all results 
are the same as the unrestricted case. That is, interior 
solutions take place and separation holds. That is, if sales 
take place in the domestic market, separation will hold. 
The first and second scenarios are applicable to above case. 
ii) Since if > 0 means that the expected domestic price 
is relatively higher than the expected foreign price, the 
second scenario is also applicable to this case. 
iii) If Qp = 0, equation (3.2') can be rerearranged to 
obtain [EU'(tt) p < EU'(tt) C (Q) ] and equation (3.3) can be 
rearranged to obtain [EU' (TT) F = EU' (TT) p]. Combining these 
two expressions gives 
F < C'(Q) « Qo = 0 
That is, when domestic supply is zero, the futures price is 
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less than the marginal cost, or if the futures price is less 
than the marginal cost, then the firm does not get involved in 
domestic trading. 
From equations (3.17) and (3.18) 
Z = Qp cov(rs, p) / var(p) (3.17') 
X = Qp cov(rs, r) / var(r) (3.18') 
Qp has the same formula as in equation (3.19). 
Q* = Qp* because Q^ = 0 in [Q = Qp + Q^] 
When Qjj = 0, the production decision is based on equation 
(3.19). However, the separation theorem doesn't hold. That is, 
the firm's production decision is affected by the probability 
distributions of random variables and risk attitudes because 
firm's production is based on the foreign market conditions 
and foreign market uncertainty can not be completely 
eliminated by the futures markets. The above case is similar 
to the third scenario in case 2, but separation does not hold. 
3.2.4. Case 4. Qp > 0 and Q^ > 0 
Consider cases with restrictions on the export and 
domestic supply. There are four possible situations. 
i) Qp > 0 and > 0 
ii) Qp > 0 and Qp = 0 
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iii) Qf = 0 and Qp > 0 
iv) Qf = 0 and Qj, = 0 
The restrictions of Qp > 0 and > 0 give the following 
first order conditions; 
E[U'(7r)(rs- C- K)] < 0 and [aEU(7r)/aQp] Q, = 0 (3.1") 
E[U'(7r)(p - C'(Q))] < 0 and [dE\J{iT)/dQ^] QD = 0 (3.2'') 
Equation (3.3) and (3.4) are the same as in the previous case. 
i) If Qp > 0, equation (3.1") holds with equality, while 
(3.2'') may not. Then equation (3.1'') and (3.2'') using (3.3) 
would be as follows: 
EU'(7r) E rs + cov(U'(7r), rs) - EU'(tt) (C'+ K) = 0 (3.1'") 
EU'(TT) F - EU'(7r) C'(Q) < 0 (3.2'") 
Subtracting (3.1'") from (3.2'") and dividing by EU'(TT) 
gives: 
F + K - Ers - cov(U'(7r), rs) / EU'(TT) < 0 
Because the third term in above inequality equation represents 
the positive risk premium, we get the following result 
F < [Ers - K] Qp > 0 (3.21) 
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and from equation (3.1'") using equation (3.17') and (3.18') 
o; - • E l S-K-C'iO) (3.22) 
Xvai{rs) (1 -p„p - Ptsx) 
In this case we can not make the production decision or 
determine the level of domestic supply because of the 
simultaneous binding conditions in the two markets. In order 
to determine the production decision we need to use a 
constraint such that 
Qp > 0 or Qp = 0. If Qp > 0 and > 0, then all results are 
the same as the unrestricted case because a firm sells its 
output domestically and abroad only when the net expected 
foreign price and the expected domestic price are competitive. 
Alternatively if Qj, > 0, we need a constraint on Qp such as 
Qp > 0 or Qp = 0 to solve the system. 
ii) If Qp > 0 and == 0 (this is the same as the third 
scenario in case 3), 
Z = Qp cov(rs, p) / var(p) 
X = Qp cov(rs, r) / var(r) 
and equation (3.1'") holds with equality, while (3.2'") 
still may not hold. Then from equation (3.2'") we can get 
following F < C (Q) *» Q^ and from equation (3.22) 
Ers - K - C (Q) > 0 in order for Qp* > 0 . Combining the 
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above two inequality conditions gives 
F < C (Q) < (Ers - K) Qp > 0 and = 0 
Qp* is the same as in equation (3.22) 
Q* = Qp* because is set to zero by Q=Qp+Qp 
Therefore, if Qp > 0 and Q^ = 0, production decision is based 
on equation (3.22) because the production decision is based on 
the foreign market conditions due to a restriction on the 
domestic market (Qp = 0) . The separation theorem does not 
hold. This is the same as the case of the unrestricted Qp and 
Qd = 0. 
iii) If Qp > 0, equation (3.2'') holds with equality but 
(3.1") may not. Then equation (3.1'') and (3.2") using (3.3) 
would be as follows: 
EU'(7r) Ers + cov(U'(7r), rs) - EU'(tt) (C'+ K) < 0 (3.1^) 
EU'(7r) F - EU'(7r) C (Q) = 0 (3.2*) 
Subtracting (3.2®) from (3.1*) gives: 
E r s - F - K <  -  c o v ( U ' ( 7 r ) ,  r s )  /  E U ' ( TT) ** Q^ > 0 (3.3*) 
Here, -cov(U'(7r), rs) / EU'(TT) represents the risk premium 
which is positive. Therefore, if the difference between 
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expected foreign price and certain futures price is less than 
the risk premium, then the firm will supply its output in 
domestic market. In this case, we can decide the production 
decision. The reason is that we can get the condition 
[F = C'(Q)] from equation (3.2") with equality and (3.3) 
since equation (3.2'') holds with equality. That is, when 
Qp > 0, the possible situation is Qp > 0 or Qp = 0. If Qp > 0 
and Qp > 0, this is the same as the unrestricted case. If 
Qg > 0 and Qp = 0, the firm produces output only if the 
condition (F = C(Q)) holds because the firm sells output in 
domestic market. If the one condition (Q^ > 0) exists, the 
following equations are the same as the unrestricted case. 
F = C'(Q) 
Z = Q(, + Qp cov(rs, p) / var(p) 
X = Qp cov(rs, r) / var(r) 
If Qp > 0 and Qp = 0 (this is the same as the third scenario 
in Case 2) 
F = C'(Q) 
Z = Q* = Qo 
Whenever Qp = 0, X = 0 because X is a hedge on exchange rate 
uncertainty. From equation (3.3®) we can get following result 
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F > E rs •» Qp > 0 and = 0 
Therefore, if > 0 and Qp = 0, production is decided at the 
point that F = C(Q) and separation theorem still holds and 
optimal hedge ratio is 1. 
iv) If Qp = Qjj = 0 (only speculative terms exist) 
Z = (F - E p) / X var(p) 
X = (R - E r) / A var(r) 
If F > Ep then Z > 0 ; sell the commodity futures. 
If F < Ep then Z < 0 ; purchase the commodity futures. 
If F = Ep (unbiased), then Z = 0 
In this case a firm acts as a speculator who, according to 
Anderson and Danthine (1983), is a participant in the futures 
market but does not possess the any quantity of physical 
commodity. If the futures price is an unbiased estimate of the 
expected spot price, the firm does not want to participate in 
the futures market. Because the firm acts as a speculator it 
requires a risk premium for its risk-bearing in the futures 
markets. Therefore, the firm participates in the futures 
markets only when there is normal backwardation or contango. 
The firm sells the commodity or currency futures under the 
contango, which is defined as the futures price that is 
greater than the expected spot price (F>Ep or R>Er). 
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The firm purchases the commodity or currency futures under the 
normal backwardation, which is the futures price that is less 
than the expected spot price (F<Ep or R<Er). Therefore, if the 
restrictions on the two markets (0^=0^=0) exist, the firm does 
not produce and participate in the futures market as a 
speculator only when there is normal backwardation or 
contango. 
3.3. The incomplete market model 
In this section we consider interactions between the 
production and futures markets available to the firm for 
hedging. Denote the optimal solutions in the absence of the 
currency futures market by tt® and in the absence of the 
commodity futures market by tt® and in the absence of the 
commodity and currency futures market by tt", as opposed to ir*, 
the optimal solution when both hedging markets exist. All 
variables are the same as in the complete market model. 
3.3.1. No commodity and currency futures markets 
Consider the case where the firm has access to neither a 
commodity futures market nor an exchange rate futures market. 
The firm cannot avoid risks through futures hedging. The 
optimization problem is 
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Max EU(7r") 
s.t Tt" = rsQp + pQg - C(Qp+Qp) - K Qp (3.23) 
The first order conditions for optimality are 
E[U'(7r")( rs - C- K)] = 0 (3.24) 
E[U' (TT") ( p - C') =0 (3.25) 
Rewriting (2.24) and (2.25) yield 
EU'(7r") C = EU'(7r") E rs + cov(U'(TT") , rs) (3.26) 
EU'(7r") C = EU'(7r") Ep + cov(U'(7r"), p) (3.27) 
If we solve equation (3.26) and (3.27) simultaneousely we 
obtain the following solutions. 
QP _ var{p) {Ezs-C'l - covers, p) {Ep-C''\ ^, 
X var (rs) var (p) ( 1 - p|sp) 
Q H  _ varjrs) [Ep-C'] - cov(rs,p) [Ers-d] 
kvarirs)var(p) (l-pLp) 
qP 0 iff [grg- d] ^ covjrs, p) [Ep-d] var(p) 
^ „ vff [Ep-d] ^ cov(rs,p) 
^ ° [BiS-c'l var(rs) 
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The firm can not hedge its risk in the domestic or foreign 
market because there are no futures markets. When the ratio of 
expected net unit revenue from the foreign market and the 
domestic market is greater than the ratio between the 
covariance of rs and p, and variance of p, the firm exports 
its output in the foreign market. If cov(rs, p) < var(p), the 
firm is willing to export its output even though expected net 
unit revenue in the foreign market is less than the expected 
net unit revenue in the domestic market. If we compare 
equation (3.28) with equation (3.19), whether to export or 
import depends only on foreign market conditions when both 
hedging markets exist, but depends on both foreign and 
domestic market conditions when the futures markets do not 
exist. If the ratio of expected net unit revenue between the 
domestic market and the foreign market is greater than the 
ratio of the covariance between rs and p, and the variance of 
rs, the firm supplies its output in the domestic market. 
Now investigate the impact of the existence of a futures 
market on production. When both hedging markets exist, 
C (Q*) = F (equation 3.5). When neither hedging markets 
exists, from equation (3.27) we can get the following; 
EU'(7r")C'= EU'(7r")Ep + cov(U'(tt") ,p) . 
If divide by EU' (tt") , then 
C'(Q") = Ep + COV(U'(TT") ,p)/EU'(TT") (3.27') 
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If the two equations (3.5) and (3.27') are compared 
C'iQ*) _ F ^ 
C'(£)") g- ^ cov(U'm.p) (3.30) 
EU'i-n) 
If we assume that futures market is considered unbiased (i.e., 
Ep=F), then the left hand side of equation (3.30) is greater 
than 1. The reason is that Ep= F and 
cov(U'(7r"), p) / EU'(7r") = [EU"(7r") / EU'(tt") ] cov(7r, p) < 0 
since EU''(7r") < 0, EU'(tt") > 0 and cov(7r,p) > 0. If both 
futures markets do not exist, the firm can not hedge some 
price risks. This makes production less than in the certainty 
case. Because production is less under uncertainty than under 
certainty (Sandmo). Therefore, if futures markets are 
introduced to the market, production increases since the 
producer (or hedger) can make a production decision with 
certainty by using futures markets. 
3.3.2. A commodity futures markets only 
Consider the case where the firm only has access to a 
commodity futures market. The optimization problem is 
Max EU(%^) 
s.t TT® = ri Qp + pQg - C(Qp+Qo) - K Qp + (F - p) Z (3.31) 
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The first order conditions for optimality are 
E[U' (7r=) (rs - C- K) ] = 0 
E[U' (?c) (P - C')] = 0 
E [ U '  ( 7 r = )  ( F  -  p )  ]  = 0  
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
From (3.33) and (3.34) we can get 
F = C (QC) (3.35) 
With the existance of a commodity futures market only the 
firm's production is given by equation (3.35). Hence does 
not depend on the utility function or the probability 
distribution of the random variables. That means the 
separation theorem still holds when only the commodity futures 
market is introduced to the market. 
If futures market is considered unbiased (i.e., F = Ep), 
then we get the following equations. 
QF Érs - K - F (3.36) 
Xvarirs) (1-prsp) 
(3.37) 
Cd - Q" - QF  (3.38) 
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If we compare equation (3.36) with equation (3.17) the 
condition in which the firm exports or imports its output is 
exactly the same as the case of the existence of the commodity 
and currency futures market although the absolute level of 
export is different. That means, currency futures market do 
not affect the condition of export but affect the absolute 
amount of export. Equation (3.37) is exactly the same as 
equation (3.17) which represents the optimal hedge under the 
existence of both hedging markets. 
From equation (3.17) and (3.36) 
Qp* ^ Qf" since ^ 0 
Because the correlation between rs and r is positive, export 
under the existence of two futures markets is greater than the 
export under the existence of the commodity futures market 
only. 
3.3.3. An exchange futures market only 
Consider the case where there is only an exchange rate 
futures markets. The optimization problem is 
Max EU(7r®) 
S.t TT® = rsQp + pQp - C(Qp+Qp) - K Qp + (R - r) X (3.39) 
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The first order conditions for optimality are 
E[U' (TT®) {rs - C- K}] = 0 
E[U' (TT®) {p - C'}] = 0 
E[U' (IT") {R - r}] = 0 
(3.41) 
(3.40) 
(3.42) 
Rewriting equations (3.40), (3.41) and (3.42) yield 
EU'(n) Ers + cov(U'(TT) ,rs) - EU'(tt) [C'+ K] = 0 
EU'(TT) Ep + COV(U' (TT) ,p) - EU'(7r) C = 0 
E U ' ( 7 r )  R  -  E U ' ( 7 r )  E r  -  c o v ( U ' (  ) ,  r )  = 0  
Dividing by EU'(tt) and applying Stein's theorem to the above 
equations gives: 
Ers - (C'+ K) = A, [Qp var(rs) + cov(rs,p) - X cov(rs,r)] 
Ep - C' = A [Qp cov(rs,p) + Qp var(p)] 
Er - R = A [Qp cov(rs,r) - X var(r) ] 
If we simultaneousely solve the above equations, then we get 
the following expressions: 
Q0 _ var(p) [Efs-C' - IC] - cov(rs,p) [Ep-C'] 
Xvaiirs) var{p) [l-pLp-pLj 
_ [Ep-d] var{rs) (1-pLr) - [Erë-C'-Kl cov(rs,p) 
X var (rs) var ip) [ 1 - p|sp - p^ ]^ 
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Qp ^ 0 iff [ErS - C'-IC\  ^ covirs, p) 
[Ep - C'] varip) 
i 0 iff {Ep - C']  ^ covjxs, p) 
[Ers - C'-K] varirs) (l-pLr) 
When there is only an exchange futures market, whether the 
firm exports or not depends on the relation between the ratio 
of net expected returns and the ratio of covariance and 
variance of random variables (rs and p). If we compare 
equation (3.43) with (3.28) we can see that currency futures 
market does not affect the condition of export but does affect 
the absolute amount of export. The condition of domestic 
market supply is different from the case without both hedging 
markets. 
3.4. The model with basis risk in commodity futures 
In this section we add basis risk in the commodity 
futures contract to the previous complete market model. The 
firm additionally faces a random variable f which is the 
commodity futures price at maturity date. Since basis risk is 
random fluctuations in the difference between the cash market 
price and the futures contract price at a specified date, this 
risk can not be eliminated by hedging. 
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The optimization problem is 
Max EU(7r) 
s.t TT = ri Qp + P Qo - C(Qp+Qg) - K Qp + (F - f)Z + (R - r)X 
The first order conditions are 
E[U'(7r)(rs - C' - K)] = 0 (3.45) 
E[U' (TT) (p - C')] = 0 (3.46) 
E[U' (TT) (F - f) ] = 0 (3.47) 
E[U' (TT) (R - r) ] = 0 (3.48) 
Applying Stein's theorem to the first order conditions and 
rearranging them gives the following equations: 
Ers - C (Q) - K = X[Qp var(rs) + cov(rs,p) - Z cov(rs,f) 
- X cov(rs,r)] (3.49) 
Ep - c (Q) = A[Qp cov(rs,p) + Qp var(p) - Z cov(p,f)] (3.50) 
Ef - F = A[Qp cov(rs,f) + cov(p,f) - Z var(f)] (3.51) 
Er - R = X[Qp cov(rs,r) - X var(r)] (3.52) 
If futures markets are considered unbiased (i.e., F=Ep and 
R=Er), then equations (3.51) and (3.52) yield 
Z = Qp cov(rs,f)/var(f) + Q^ cov(p,f)/var(f) (3.53) 
X = Qp cov(rs,r)/var(r) (3.54) 
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Equation (3.53) represents the optimal hedge. The level of the 
hedge consists of two parts: the first part is for hedging the 
foreign price risk, second is for hedging the domestic price 
risk. The firm sells the commodity futures contract 
(Qjj cov(rs, f)/var(f ) ) to hedge the domestic price risk of 
selling output (Q^) in domestic market and sells the commodity 
futures contract (Qp cov(rs,f)/var(f)) to hedge the foreign 
price risk, and simultaneously sells the currency futures 
contracts (Qp cov(rs,r)/var(r)) in order to hedge the exchange 
rate risk for exporting Qp. 
In no markets (foreign and domestic) can the firm 
completely hedge the price risks, because foreign price is 
multiplied by exchange rate and basis risk exists in commodity 
futures markets. So the hedging effectiveness depends on the 
relationships between foreign price or domestic price and 
futures price. 
If we simultaneously solve equations (3.49), (3.50), 
(3.51) and (3.52) we get following: 
_ g(l-ppf) var(p) - P(prsp-PcfpMf)/Tv^ar(rs)/Tvar(p) ) (3.55) 
^ " D 
. P(l-pLf-pLr) var(rg) 
QD - N 
^ (3.56) 
-S(p„p-ppfp^aPy/Tvai{rs))yflvar (p) ) 
D 
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_ g  (prsf -PrspPpf)  (P)  yvar  (rs) y/var  ( f )  -  P  p var  ( rs )  y /vâf  (p)  yvar  
vaz(f) D 
(3.57) 
- Of (3.58) 
varU) 
where D s Avar(rs)var(p) [1- 2 + 
Prs/ Pp/ + 2 P,gp p,3f Ppf] is denominator. 
S = [Ers - C(Q) - K] is the expected net revenue in 
foreign market 
P = [Ep - C(Q)] is the expected net revenue in domestic 
market 
P ~ Prsr Ppf Ppsp Ppsf Ppf 
Equations (3.55) and (3.56) represent the optimal export or 
import quantity, and optimal quantity of the domestic supply 
or purchase. Equations (3.57) and (3.58) indicate the optimal 
commodity and currency hedge. 
If we assume that D > 0 
o;  ao  i f f  ^  % (Prsp  PpfPrsf )  \ /^ (P)  (3 .59)  
p  (1  -  Ppf) v/var  (p)  
o ;  ao  I f f  f  k PpfPrsf) V^_(p)_  (3 .60)  
^  ( l -prs f -p„r)  V^^(rs )  
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z* ^  0 iff — & p yvar (rs)— (3.61) 
^ (Prsf-PrspPpf) ^ vâr (P) 
Equation (3.59) and (3.60) represent conditions on whether the 
firm exports or imports in foreign market and sells or buys in 
the domestic market. Equation (3.61) indicates whether the 
firm sells or buys futures contracts or does not involve 
itself in the futures market. 
If basis risk in commodity futures market is introduced, 
the production and hedging decision are not separated, and the 
production decision depends on risk attitudes and/or the 
probability distribution of the random variables. Under the 
existence of basis risk, hedging means that price risk is 
substituted by basis risk. Hedging is effective because the 
price variance is usually larger than the basis variance. The 
export or import decision is affected by domestic and foreign 
market conditions when basis risk is introduced to the model. 
Alternatively, the export or import decision is affected only 
by foreign market conditions without basis risk. The firm can 
perfectly hedge its risk in domestic market with no basis 
risk, but the firm can overhedge or underhedge in the domestic 
market under basis risk even though the firm's hedges are the 
same in the foreign market regardless of basis risk or no 
basis risk. 
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3.5. Summary 
The objective of this chapter examines behavior of an 
expected utility maximizing firm which faces both price and 
exchange rate uncertainty when the firm has acess to both a 
commodity futures and a currency futures markets. To 
facilitate this examination in the complete market model, four 
possible cases are considered as far as trade restrictions. 
First, when Qp and are unrestricted, the production 
decision does not depend on the utility function or the 
probability distribution of the random variables. That is, the 
separation theorem holds. However, marketing decisions (and 
hedging decision) are affected by uncertainty even though 
there are hedging instruments. Whether the firm exports or 
imports depends on the relative prices between the expected 
net foreign price (Ers - k) and the certain futures price (F). 
When (Ers - k) > F or (Ers - k) » F, the firm exports and if 
(Ers - k) » F, its optimal hedge: Z = -Qo+Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p) 
and if (Ers - k) > F (but not much large), its optimal hedge: 
Z = Qd + Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p). When (Ers - k) = F, the firm does 
not involve in foreign trading, and the optimal hedge 
Z = QQ. When (Ers - k) < F, the firm imports and its optimal 
hedge Z = - Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p). In a commodity market, the 
firm may overhedge or underhedge even with the unbiasedness 
and no basis risk assumptions. However, in a currency market. 
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the firm fully hedges. If the commodity or currency futures 
price incorporates a risk premium, the firm hedges less than 
in the case of unbiasedness. So we can imagine that there will 
be underhedging under normal backwardation and overhedging 
under contango. 
Second, when Qp > 0 and is unrestricted 
if Qp > 0, all results are the same as the unrestricted case. 
If Qp = 0, the separation theorem still holds, and the firm 
hedges its entire output. 
Third, when Qp is unrestricted and Q^ > 0 
if Qp = 0, the separation theorem does not hold because firm's 
production is based on the foreign market conditions with 
uncertainty, and the firm's hedge is not a full hedge, which 
depends on the relationships between covariance and variance 
of random variables. 
Finally, when Qp > 0 and Q^ > 0, there are four possible 
situations. However, because three situations are similar to 
the previous cases, we consider the case of Qp = Qp = 0. 
If Qp = QQ = 0, the firm does not produce and participate in 
the futures market as a speculator, and it participates in the 
futures markets only when there is normal backwardation or 
contango. 
When we compare the complete market model with the 
incomplete market model, we find that if futures markets are 
introduced to the market, production increases since the 
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producer (or hedger) can make a production decision with 
certainty by using futures markets. 
If basis risk in commodity futures market is introduced 
to the complete market model, the production and hedging 
decision are not separated, and the production decision 
depends on risk attitudes and/or the probability distribution 
of the random variables. The firm can overhedge or underhedge 
in the domestic market with basis risk even though the firm's 
hedges are the same in the foreign market regardless of basis 
risk or no basis risk. 
This chapter is important beacuse this study provides 
some insight into the risk shifting role of futures market 
and marketing strategy when there is both commodity and 
exchange rate uncertainty, and this model is applicable in 
real world if cost function is known. In next chapter we'll 
examine the general producing and trading firm with a futures 
market in the commodity and currency under basis and exchange 
rate uncertainty. However, the firm's behavior is different in 
that the firm exports or imports by forward contracts. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE BEHAVIOR OF A FORWARD EXPORTING OR 
IMPORTING FIRM 
4.1. Introduction 
Following Paroush and Wolf (1986), "the volume of trade 
in forward markets is a significant level of activity relative 
to that in the futures markets. Commodities which are actively 
traded on both forward and futures markets are generally 
international commodities, i.e., commodities that are traded 
on domestic markets as well as on foreign markets." Futures 
contracts and forward contracts are usually thought to be 
synonomous in most of the academic literature. But in general 
this is not true, although they serve the same economic 
functions. Forward contracts are distinguished from futures 
contracts by their differing legal characteristics and 
specifications. Following Black (1976), "a forward contract is 
a contract to buy or sell at a price that stays fixed for the 
life of the contract; a futures contract is settled every day 
and rewritten at the new futures price; a futures contract is 
like a series of forward contracts." There are possible 
disadvantages in forward contracts: first, there is the 
possibility of default, second, forward contracts are not 
traded continuously, third, there are high search costs and 
transaction costs due to illiquidity. The advantage of forward 
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contracts is that there is no basis risk. 
There are differences in the competitive firm's behavior 
between when the firm exports directly and exports by forward 
contract under uncertainty. Therefore, we also need to examine 
the hedging and production rules for the firm which can export 
or import forward and supply or purchase output in the 
domestic market under price, and exchange rate uncertainties, 
and basis risk. The market environments are the same as in the 
model of Chapter 3. 
4.2. The model 
In this case the firm's profits in domestic currency 
units can be expressed as 
TT = r Pp Qp + p Qo - C(Qp+Qg) - KQp + (F - f )Z + (R -r )X 
The following notation is used: 
Pp= the commodity forward contract price in foreign currency 
to be paid in (t+1) (certain) 
Qp= quantity exported forward (if Qp > 0) or imported forward 
(if Qp < 0) in (t+1) 
Qp= quantity in domestic market in (t+1) 
K= unit cost of forward trading (i.e., search cost and 
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transaction cost) 
F= futures price in t for delivery in t+1 (certain) 
f= futures price in (t+1) 
All other variables are the same as in the previous model 
There are four decision variables: Qp, Q^, Z and X, and three 
sources of uncertainty: r, p, f. The producer (or trader) can 
choose to purchase in one market and sell in the other market 
depending on relative prices. As in the model of Chapter 3, if 
the firm is an international commodity trading company without 
production, then C(Q) must be interpreted in a different 
fashion to represent the cost of purchasing, storing and 
transporting the commodity. 
The optimization problem is 
Max EU(7r) s.t 
Qf, Qd/ Z, X 
TT = rppQp + pQQ - C(Qp+Qo) -KQp + (F-f)Z + (R-r)X 
There are four possible cases. 
1. Qp and Qp are unrestricted 
2. Qp > 0 and Qg is unrestricted (no foreign purchase) 
3. Qp unrestricted and Qp > 0 (no domestic purchase) 
4. Qp > 0 and Qp > 0 (no purchasing) 
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4.2.1. Case 1. Qp and are unrestricted 
The competitive firm can export or import forward as well 
as sell or buy its output in domestic markets in this case. 
The first order conditions for an optimum are 
E[U'(7r)(rpp - C - K)] = 0 (4.1) 
E[U' (TT) (P - C')] =0 (4.2) 
E[U' (TT) (F - f) ] = 0 (4.3) 
E[U' (TT) (R - r) ] =0 (4.4) 
Substituting (4.4) into (4.1) and simplifying yields 
EU'(TT) R PP = E[U'(TT) (C'+ K) ] (4.5) 
We can divide (4.5) by EU'(tt) since R Pp and C are 
deterministic. Then 
[R Pp - K] = C (Q) (4.6) 
Here [R Pp - K] is a certain net unit revenue of forward 
trading in terms of domestic currency (net forward price). 
Under the existence of both commodity and currency futures 
markets, the firm's optimum production is given by equation 
(4.6). Hence Q* (=Qp+Q(,) does not depend on the utility 
59 
function (i.e., the degree of risk aversion) or the 
probability distribution of the random variables. Although 
basis risk due to a uncertain f exists, the separation theorem 
still holds since exchange rate uncertainty can be completely 
eliminated by the exchange rate futures market. 
Why do the first order conditions differ between Chapter 
3 and 4. The intuition is that because production under 
certainty is larger than under uncertainty (Sandmo), the firm 
want to decide the production decision under certainty. The 
firm's production decision in chapter 3 is decided at the 
domestic market condition because domestic market price 
uncertainty can be completely hedged by using domestic 
commodity futures market, but in the foreign market risk still 
exists because the foreign price multiplied by exchange rate 
is not completely hedged by futures markets. While the firm's 
production decision in this chapter is decided at the certain 
foreign market condition. Because the firm exports or imports 
by forward contract without uncertainty and exchange rate 
uncertainty can be completely hedged by currency futures 
market but domestic market uncertainty can not be completely 
hedged due to basis risk. Therefore, the first order 
conditions differ between Chapter 3 and 4 because of different 
market conditions and the firm's favor on certainty. 
Combining equation (4.2) and (4.5) and rewriting (4.3) 
and (4.5) yields 
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(RPp - K) = Ep + cov(U'(7r), p) / EU'(7r) 
F = Ef + cov(U'(F), f) / EU'(f) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
R = Er + cov(U'(?), r) / EU'(f) (4.9) 
We assume that p(or f) and r are independent. Then cov(p,r)=0 
and cov(f,r) = 0. Applying Stein's theorem to equation (4.7) 
yields: 
Ep - (Rpp - K) = A [Qg var(p) - Z cov(p, f) ] 
If Ep > (Rpp - K) then Z / Qp < var(p)/cov(p, f) 
When the expected domestic price is greater than the net 
forward price regardless of biased or unbiasedness 
assumptions, the optimal hedge ratio depends on the 
relationships between the variance and covariance of random 
variables. 
If we solve the above equations using Stein's theorem we 
get the following expressions 
2* covjp, f) _ {E£ - F) 
°  v a r  i f )  X v a r i f )  (4.10) 
Qn* - — k v a r ( p )  ( l - p 2 )  
Ep+ K - Rpp {E~f-F) covjp, f) (4.11) 
X v a r i p )  v a r  i f )  (l-p^) 
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- -
where = [{cov(p, f) }^] / [var(p) var(f)] represents the 
correlation coefficient. Theoretically, spot and futures 
prices should exhibit positive covariance and this 
relationship is confirmed empirically (Ederington (1979)). 
The first term in the solution (4.10) is the hedging 
component. The second term is the speculative component. If 
the futures market is considered unbiased (i.e., F = Ef), then 
the speculative component disappears, and the optimal hedge 
ratio is 
I -
The optimal hedge is not a full hedge since there is basis 
risk. If p and f are perfectly correlated, the optimal hedge 
is a full hedge. However, if the futures market is considered 
biased, then the futures position is altered by the amount of 
bias adjusted by the level of risk aversion and the futures 
price variability. Risk attitudes (A) only affect the 
speculative component. 
The first term in the solution (4.11) is the hedging 
component. The second term is the speculative component. If 
the futures market is considered unbiased (i.e., F = Ef), then 
the speculative component disappears, and optimal domestic 
supply is 
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Although the firm hedges using the futures contract, there is 
still uncertainty. That is, price uncertainty cannot be 
completely eliminated due to basis risk. Hence, in determining 
the absolute level of domestic supply, the firm takes into 
account its attitude toward risk, the probability distribution 
of random variable p, futures prices and correlation between 
p and f. 
If the futures price is an unbiased estimate of the 
expected futures price, 
Qo > 0 iff Ep > R Pp - K 
Qp < 0 iff Ep < R Pp - K 
That is, if expected domestic price is less than the net 
fotward price, then the firm buy in domestic market and sell 
it foreign market by forward contracts. 
Substituting (4.11) into (4.10) yields 
_ [Ep + K - Rpp] covjp, f) _ [âf - F] (4.15) 
A(l-p2) vai(f) var(p) Ad-p^) vax{f) 
Under the unbiased condition (F = Ef) 
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g. _ [Ep + K - Rp^] COvip, f) (4.15) 
A(l-p2) varif) var(p) 
Z* k 0 iff Ep > R Pp - K 
If we assume unbiasedness in commodity futures market and if 
Ep > [Rpp -K], then a short position is taken in futures and 
a short spot position is taken in the domestic market. That 
is, the firm sells output in domestic market, and also hedges. 
However, if Ep = [R Pp - K], the firm does not use the futures 
market, because the firm want to sell its output in the 
foreign market by forward contract without uncertainty. If Ep 
< [R Pp - K], Qp < 0, a long position is taken in futures and 
long spot position is taken in the domestic market. That is, 
the firm buys its output in domestic market and sells it in 
foreign market, and hedges its output bought in domestic 
market by purchasing futures. Therefore, the firm always 
hedges its output regardless of whether Ep > (Rpp - K) or 
Ep < (Rpp - K). That is, there is no speculation under the 
unbiasedness assumption. This is different from other model's 
results. Here, exchange rate uncertainty cannot affect 
commodity hedging decisions because domestic price uncertainty 
is hedged using the commodity futures contract and the 
exchange rate uncertainty is completely eliminated by using 
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the exchange rate futures contract. 
The first and the second term in the right hand side of 
equation (4.12) are the hedging component and the speculative 
component. If the exchange futures market is considered 
unbiased (i.e., R = Er) 
X* = Pf QF (4.16) 
Then we say that the firm fully hedges; namely, it sells on 
the futures market all its foreign exchange proceeds. The sign 
of X* depends on Q*. If Qp > 0, the firm sells currency futures 
contracts to hedge the exchange risk for exporting Qp by 
forward contract. If Qp < 0, the firm buys currency futures 
contracts to hedge the exchange risk for importing Qp by 
forward contract. Therefore, if firm exports or imports 
forward and sells or buys output in the domestic market and 
basis risk is allowed, then the separation theorem still 
holds, and the firm fully hedges in currency market, but 
doesn't fully hedge in commodity market. 
With and without basis risk 
When there is no basis risk, (i.e., f 
level of output is 
= p), the optimal 
65 
The relationship between and Z is therefore given by 
Qo* > Z as Ep > R Pp - K 
It is clear that producers will completely hedge only if they 
expect Ep = (Rpp-K) . If the firm expects Ep > (R Pp - K) , they 
will be less willing to buy insurance in the futures market. 
On the other hand, if the firm expects Ep < (R Pp - K), they 
will attempt to overhedge by selling more output in the 
futures markets than they plan to supply in the domestic 
market. 
In the case of basis risk 
Q* _ [.gp + K - RPp] ^ cov{p, f) (4.18) 
° X var (p ) var (p ) 
It can be seen that the general relationship between Qp* and Z 
is 
Qo ii Z as (Ep + K - Rpp) à  Xvarip) ( 1  -  z 
vai (p ) 
Because X var(p)[QQ-Z] = 
(Ep+K-Rpp) - A.var(p){l - (cov(p, f)/v(p) ) Z 
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The two models are equivalent only if /3 (=cov(p, f)/var(p))=l 
(a sufficient condition for which is p = f). If Af is less 
volatile than Ap (iS<l), the firm could overhedge by selling 
more output in futures market than they plan to supply output 
in domestic market, even though they expect Ep < (R Pp - K) . 
4.2.2. Case 2. Qp > 0 and is unrestricted 
Consider the case of restrictions on imports but no 
restrictions on domestic sales. The restriction on Qj,(^ ) 
changes equation (4.1) to the inequality condition; 
E[U'(7r)(rpp - C'(Q) - K) < 0 and [8EU(n)/aQp] Q, = 0 (4.1') 
Equation (4.2) (4.3) and (4.4) are the same as before. 
In this restricted form if Qp > 0, all results are the same as 
the unrestricted case. In this restricted case there are two 
possible situations. First, Qp > 0 and > 0 because the net 
hedged forward price (Rpp - K) and expected domestic price 
(Ep) are very competitive. Second, Qp> 0 and < 0 because 
(RPp - K) > Ep. That is, all product produced and bought in 
domestic market and sold in foreign market. If Qp = 0, from 
equation (4.1') and (4.4) we can get following: 
RPp - K < C'(Q) « Qp = 0 
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If we rearrange the first order conditions, we can get the 
following solutions: 
Q; . 
X v a r i p )  (1 - ppf) 
2» _ (gjg - C') cov{p, f) 
Xvax(p) (1 - Ppf) 
Z / Qp = cov(p, f) / var(f) 
If (Rpp - K) < C (Q) , then Qp = 0 and the firm's production is 
decided in equation of That is, separation between the 
production and marketing decisions does not hold and firm's 
production decision is affected by the probability of random 
variables and risk attitudes because the firm's production is 
based on the domestic market conditions and domestic market 
uncertainty cannot completely eliminated by the futures market 
due to basis risk. If Ep > C(Q), a short position is taken in 
futures and a short spot position is taken in the domestic 
markets and the optimal hedge ratio (Z/Q) = cov(p, f)/ var(f). 
If Ep = C(Q), no position is taken in futures and spot 
markets. 
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4.2.3. Case 3. Qp is unrestricted and > 0 
In this case the firm can not buy in the domestic market 
but can buy or sell in the foreign market. Equation (4.2) will 
be changed as following due to a restriction on Q^. 
E[U'(7r)(p - C'(Q))] < 0 and [aEU(7r)/aQp] = 0 (4.2') 
Equation (4.1) (4.3) and (4.4) are same. 
If Qp > 0, all results are the same as the unrestricted case. 
However, if Qp = 0, we can get different results: 
Ep < (Rpp - K) « Qq = 0 
RPp - K = C' (Q) 
Q* = Qf* and Qp = Z = 0 
X = Pf Qp 
Therefore, if Ep < (Rpp - K), then the firm's production 
decision is still decided at the point that (Rpp - K) = C (Q) , 
and the firm does not supply its output in the domestic market 
and export all its output by forward contract and does not 
take commodity futures contract. That is, separation theorem 
holds only under specific conditions; Ep < (Rpp - K) . 
The firm fully hedges in foreign exchange market. 
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4.2.4. Case 4. when Qp > 0 and > 0 
Consider the case of the restrictions on the export and 
domestic supply. The restrictions of Qp > 0 and Qp > 0 bring 
the following first order conditions: 
E[U'(7r)(rs - C'(Q))] < 0 and [aEU(7r)/aQp] Qp = 0 (4.1'') 
EtU'(7r)(p - C'(Q))] < 0 and [aEU(7r)/aQp] = 0 (4.2") 
Equation (4.3) and (4.4) are the same as the previous case. 
i) . If Qp > 0, equation (4.1") holds with equality while 
(4.2") may not. Subtracting (4.1'') with equality from 
(4.2'') and using (4.4) gives the following condition: 
Ep - (Rpp - K) < -cov(U'(7r), p)/EU'(7r) <» Qp > 0 
Here -cov(U'(7r), p)/EU'(7r) represents the risk premium which 
is positive. If the difference between certain net forward 
price and expected domestic spot price is less than the risk 
premium, the firm will export its output by forward contract. 
If Qp > 0 and Qp = 0 
RPP - K = C (Q) 
Q — Qp and Qp = Z = 0 
X = Pp Qp 
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If Qp > 0 and Q[, = 0, production is decided at the point that 
[RPp - K] = C(Q), and all output will export by forward 
contract and no hedge in commodity markets. 
ii). If Qp > 0, equation (4.2") holds with equality but 
(4.1") may not. Subtracting (4.2") with equality from 
(4.1") gives : 
Ep > Rpp - K *» Qg > 0 
In this case we can not decide the production decision or the 
level of export. Because of that, we need another restiction 
such as Qp = 0. 
If Qp > 0 and Qp = 0, 
Z = Qp cov(p,f)/ var(f) 
Qp = (Ep - C'(Q)) / X var(p) (1 - PpfZ) 
If Qp > 0 and Qp = 0, then Rpp - K < C'(Q) and other things are 
the same as above. That is, the production decision is decided 
in the equation Qp. If Ep > C'(Q), a short position is taken 
in futures and short spot position is taken in the domestic 
market. However, the separation does not hold. 
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4.3. Summary 
The objective of this chapter examines the hedging and 
production rules for the firm which can export or import 
forward and supply or purchase output in the domestic market 
under price, and exchange rate uncertainties, and basis risk. 
The main results of this chapter are as followings: 
First, when Qp and Q[, are unrestricted, the production and 
hedging decisions are separated. That is, the production 
decision does not depend on the utility function or the 
probability distribution of random variables, and the 
separation theorem holds even though basis risk exists. The 
firm fully hedge in currency market, but does not fully hedge 
in commodity market. When we assume unbiasedness in commodity 
futures market, i) if Ep > (Rpp - K), then a short position is 
taken in futures and a short spot position is taken in the 
domestic market, ii) if Ep = (Rpp - K) , the firm does not use 
the futures market, iii) if Ep < (Rpp - K) , a long position is 
taken in futures and a long spot position is taken in the 
domestic market. 
Second, when Qp > 0 and Qp is unrestricted 
if Qp = 0, separation between the production and marketing 
decisions does not hold and firm's production decision is 
affected by the probability of random variables and risk 
attitudes. The optimal hedge ratio (Z/Q)=cov(p,f)/var(f) which 
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is not full hedge. 
Third, when Qp is unrestricted and Qj, > 0 
if Qp = 0, the separation theorem holds only under specific 
conditions: Ep < (Rpp - F) , and the firm fully hedges in 
foreign exchange market. 
Finally, when Qp > 0 and > 0, if Q, = = 0, the firm 
participates in the futures market as a speculator. 
Because there are differences in the competitive firm's 
behavior between when the firm exports directly and exports by 
forward contract under uncertainty, and the volume of activity 
relative to that in futures markets, the model in this chapter 
is important. In next chapter, we'll examine the behavior of 
the importing offshore firm when the firm has access to both 
U.S. commodity futures market and the currency forward markets 
of its own country. 
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CHAPTER 5. BEHAVIOR OF THE IMPORTING OFFSHORE FIRM 
5.1. Introduction 
The international use of U.S. futures markets as a risk 
management tool becomes more important as international trade 
increases. Often, an offshore firm must use the U.S. futures 
market in order to hedge commodity price risk in international 
trading because futures markets only exist in U.S.. However, 
because futures contracts in the U.S. are traded in terms of 
U.S. dollars, the offshore firm faces different risks from the 
U.S. firm. That is, the offshore firm faces an exchange rate 
risk in that currency values can change between the time a 
futures contract is placed and the time a hedge is lifted. So 
movements in the exchange rate can affect both the level and 
variability of returns from commodity trading and futures 
transactions. 
In this chapter, a model is developed to deal with the 
importing offshore firm from a small country. When the firm 
imports some materials as inputs for the production of final 
goods, it faces input price and exchange rate uncertainties. 
Therefore, the firm may want to hedge these uncertainties 
using futures contracts in U.S.. However, because this country 
is small, its currency is not traded in U.S. currency futures 
markets. But this small country has a well developed currency 
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forward market. So the firm can hedge its risks using the U.S. 
commodity futures market and its own currency forward market. 
The firm additionally faces basis risk in using U.S. commodity 
futures markets. This basis risk is important in using the 
commodity futures market internationally because traded 
commodities are not deliverable against contracts specified on 
futures exchanges, and the delivery date of the futures 
contract may not coincide with the import date of the product. 
In this case, the firm faces three uncertainties; exchange 
rate (r), commodity price (p) and futures price (f). We assume 
that the domestic currency price of final good is known with 
certainty or is relatively certain compared to input prices 
because our concern is the hedging behavior of the importing 
firm against input price and exchange rate uncertainties. The 
offshore firm pay transportation costs which are made in own 
country's currency. 
5.2. The model 
When the firm has access to both the U.S. commodity 
futures market and the currency forward markets of its own 
country, the firm's profits in domestic currency units can be 
expressed as 
rr = d G(L,M) - wL-rpM-kM + r(F - f) Z + (R - r) X 
75 
where L and M are the quantities of the two inputs in the 
production of. the final commodity, M is the imported input, d 
is the unit price of final commodity, k is the unit 
transportation cost of import, G(L,M) is a production function 
which satisfies the properties (i.e. > 0, > 0, G^^ ^ 0, 
G„„ < 0 and (GLLG„„ - > 0), w is the unit price of input L, 
p is the foreign price of the input in foreign currency in 
period (t+1), f is the commodity futures price at the maturity 
date, and other variables are the same as before. 
The optimization problem is 
Max M,L,Z,X EU(?) s.t 
if = d G(L,M) - wL-rpM-kM + r(F - f) z + (R - r) X 
The first order conditions for an optimum are 
E[U' (TT) (dG^ - w) ] = 0 
E[U' (TT) ( dG„ - rp - k) ] = 0 
E[U' (7r)r(F - f) ] = 0 
E[U' (TT) (R - r) ] = 0 
Rearranging equations (5.1) and (5.2) gives; 
GL = w/d 
G„ = (Erp + k) / d + cov(U'(TT) ,rp)/dEU'(TT) 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) represent the marginal product of 
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inputs L and M respectively. Comparing the two equations (5.5) 
and (5.6) and applying Stein's theorem gives the following 
result: 
_ (EW + k) _ ^covin, rp) (5.7) 
Gj^ w w 
where A.= -EU'' (7r)/EU'(tt) indicates the Arrow-Pratt measure of 
absolute risk aversion. 
Equation (5.7) represents the ratio of marginal productivities 
between the two inputs. If there was no uncertainty, equation 
(5.7) would be = (rp+k)/w, and the demand for the two 
inputs L and M would be determined by the non-stochastic 
prices (d,w,rp,k). However, the demand for the two inputs is 
affected additionally by the stochastic factors due to 
uncertainty. In the absence of basis risk equations (5.5) and 
(5.6) are changed to: 
dG^ = w 
dG„ = RF+k 
Then the demand for the two inputs L and M is determined by 
the non-stochastic price ratio w/d and (RF+k)/d. Thus there is 
a complete separation between the production and hedging 
decisions. However, due to basis risk, the separation does not 
hold. 
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Rearranging equations (5.2) and (5.3) and (5.4) and 
substituting equation (5.4) into (5.3) gives the following 
equations: 
E[U'(7r) dG„] - E[U'(F) (rp + k)] = 0 
E[U'(7r) RF] - E[U'(7r) (rf ) ] =0 
E[U'(7r) R] - E[U'(7r) r ] = 0 
Applying Stein's theorem to above equations yields the 
following equations; 
[dG„ - Erp -k] = A [M var(rp) - F Z cov(rp,r) + Z cov(rp,rf) 
+ X cov(rp,r) (5.8) 
[RF - Erf] = A [M cov(rp,rf) - F Z cov(rf,r) + Z var(rf) 
+ X cov(rf,r)] (5.9) 
[R - Er] = X [M cov(rp,r) - F Z var(r) + Z cov(rf,r) 
+ X var(r)] (5.10) 
If we simultaneously solve equations (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10) 
and make the unbiasedness assumptions (R=Er and RF=Erf), we 
get the following optimal decision values; 
M* - [vaz{zf) var{r) - cov^ {rf, r)\ (5.11) 
A H 
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_ [dG„-Érp-k] [cov{rp,r) cov(rf,r) -cov{rp,rf) var(r)] 
X H 
X* _ \.dG^-Éxp-k\ ^  
Icovirp, rf) {cov(rf, r) -Fvarir) ) -cov(rp, r) (var(rf) -Fcov{rf, r) ) ] 
(5.13) 
where H = var (rp)var (rf) var (r) [I-P^prf-P^p^-P^fr + Zp^prfPrprPrfr] -
Equation (5.11) represents the optimal import quantity. 
Equations (5.12) and (5.13) represent the optimal commodity 
and currency hedge for imports. Because the firm hedges its 
price risk and exchange risk under the assumption of importing 
the input, dG„ > (Erp + k) is a necessary condition for import 
and hedging without considering speculation. 
If we assume that H > 0 (which must be tested 
empirically) 
M* > 0 iff dG'(M) > (Erp + k) because var(rf)var(r) > 
cov^(rf,r) by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality (Antonovitz and 
Nelson). „ .. 
Furthermore 
Z* < 0 iff Prfr < Prprf ^nd dG'(M)>Erp 
X* < 0 iff cov(rp,rf)[cov(rf,r)-Fvar(r)] < cov(rp,r)[var(rf)-
Fcov(rf,r)] and G'(M) > (Erp + k). 
From equations (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) we can get the 
optimal hedge ratios. 
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Z* _ V^^(-rp) - PrprPrfr] 
M* Vvâr (rf) [1 - prff] 
or 
Af* 
[var{r)cov(xp,rf) - cov(rp, r) cov(r.f, r) ] 
[var(rf) var(r) - cov^ (rf, r) ] 
(5.14) 
X* - FZ* + M* >/va.I (xp) [Prprf Prfr Pxpr^ (5.15) 
y/^ (r) [1 -
In equation (5.14) the firm considers exchange rate 
uncertainty in choosing the optimal commodity hedge ratio 
because exchange rate uncertainty affects the commodity 
hedge. That is, since basis risk and exchange rate risk is 
reflected, the optimal hedge ratio is not -1. In equation 
(5.15) the firm will set its optimal foreign exchange rate 
hedge equal to its commodity hedge in foreign currency (FZ*) 
plus a factor to account for the unhedged risk of foreign 
sales due to a basis risk (the second term on the right-hand 
side of equation (5.15)). 
Suppose that there is no basis risk (i.e., f = p). 
In this case, if the forward foreign exchange market is 
unbiased, namely, Er = R and Erp = RF, then the optimal 
forward-futures contract becomes a full double-hedge, i.e. Z* 
= - M* and X* = F Z*. However, because there is basis risk, the 
full double-hedge does not hold and the separation theorem 
does not hold either. 
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5.3. The effects of introducing futures markets 
In this section we examine the effect of introducing a 
futures market to the offshore country. Denote the optimal 
solutions with only the existence of the exchange rate forward 
market by tt® and in the absence of the commodity futures 
market and the currency forward market by tt", as opposed to , 
the optimal solution when both hedging markets exist. 
Consider the case when the offshore firm has access to 
neither a commodity futures market nor an exchange rate 
forward market. The optimization problem is 
Max „ EU(7r") s.t tt" = dG(L,M) - wL - rpM-kM 
The first order conditions are 
E [ U '  ( T T " )  ( d G ^  -  w )  ]  = 0  
E [ U ' ( T T " )  ( d G „  -  r p  -  k )  ]  = 0  
If we solve above equations, we obtain the optimal quantity of 
import: 
_ [dG„ - EIS - jr] 
A, var (rp) 
(5.16) 
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Consider the case that there is only an exchange rate 
forward market. The optimization problem is 
Max EU(7r®) s.t TT® = dG(L,M) - wL - rpM - kM + (R - r) X 
The first order conditions are 
E[U' (IT) (dG^ - W)] =0 
E[ U ' ( 7 r ) ( d G „  -  r p  -  k ) ]  = 0  
E [ U '  ( T T )  ( R  -  r )  ]  = 0  
If we simultaneously solve the first order conditions under 
the unbiased assumption (R=Er), then we get the following 
optimal solutions ; 
M' - F (5.17) 
Xvar(rp) (l-prpr) 
cov(rp, T) (5 IG) 
A, (1-prpr) varirp) var{r) 
M® and X® in equations (5.17) and (5.18) represent the optimal 
quantity of import and optimal currency hedge under the 
existence of only an exchange rate forward market. 
Now examine the effect of introducing a futures market 
and a forward market to the offshore country. The method to 
check the effects of introducing the futures market is to 
compare M"(5.16), M®(5.17) and M''((5.11) when both hedging 
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markets exist. 
First, compare equation (5.16) with (5.17) to check the 
effect of introducing the currency forward market. 
e Af _ 
Af" " -  - 2  1 - Prpr 
Because the denominator (l-p^p/) < 1, M®/M" is greater than 1. 
That means, the optimal quantity of import is greater under 
the existence of only a currency forward market than without 
any hedging instruments. Therefore, if an exchange rate 
forward market is available, the offshore firm can increase 
its production by increasing imports since the production 
function G(L,M) is a concave function and the exchange rate 
uncertainty is partially hedged. 
Second, compare equation (5.16) with (5.11) to check the 
effect of introducing two hedging markets. 
— - 2 > 1 (5.19) 
^ d ~ Prprf ~ Prpr" Prfr + ^PrprfPrprPrfr^ 
If (numerator - denominator) > 0 in equation (5.19), then mVm" 
> 1 and > M". Because (numerator-denominator) = Ppppf^ -
^ Prprf PpppPrfr ^ Prpr ( Prprf " P rpr) ~ Prprf ~ ^ Prprf Prpr Prpr ^ ® 
and -1 < < 1, numerator > denominator and > M". 
Therefore, if both hedging markets are available, the offshore 
firm can also increase its production by increasing imports 
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since commdity price and exchange rate uncertainties are 
hedged. 
Lastly, compare equation (5.11) with (5.17) to analyze 
the difference between introducing both hedging markets and 
introducing only an exchange rate forward market. 
Ml - [ 1 - Prpr- Plfr + piprPrfrJ ^ ^ (5.20) 
^ [ 1 ~ P rprf ~ Prpr ~ Prfr •*" 2 p^prfP zprPzfr^ 
In equation (5.20) is greater than M® because (numerator -
denominator) = Pppp^prfp^-2p,p,^p,p,p,f,+p,p,f2 = (p,p,p,f,-p,p,f)2> 0. 
So, the firm's production with two hedging markets is larger 
than the case with only a currency forward market. 
Therefore, if the firm uses both hedging markets or only 
an exchange rate forward market, it increases production by 
increasing import stably with less uncertainties. 
Next consider the effect of introducing a Korean futures 
market. When the firm has access to both the Korean commodity 
futures and currency forward markets, the firm's optimization 
problem can be expressed as: 
Max EU(7r) s.t 
TT = dG(L,M) - wL-rpM-kM + (F-f) Z + (R - r) X (5.21) 
where F,^ is the Korean futures price of the commodity in t for 
delivery in period (t+1) and q is a Korean futures price of 
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the commodity at maturity date. 
The first order conditions are 
E[U' (TT) (dG^ - w)] =0 
E[U' (TT) (dG„ - rp - k)] 
E [ U '  ( T T )  ( F , ^  -  q )  ]  = 0  
E[U' (TT) (R - r ) ] = 0 
= 0 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
If we simultaneously solve the first order conditions and 
assume unbiasedness, we can obtain the following optimal 
decision variables: 
M. - 1^0.(5.26) 
Xvar(rp) [I-Prp^-Prpj 
z* - - - k - Eïp] covirp, q) (^5.21) 
\ var ( rp) var (p) [ 1 - plpg- p^p^] 
. - ida, - k - sm covirp. T) 
Xvar{rp)varir) [1 - p\pq - plp^ ] 
The optimal hedge ratios are; 
Z / M = - cov(rp, q) / var(f) 
X = - M cov(rp,r) / var(r) = - M Ep 
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
85 
The optimal commodity hedge and the optimal amount of import 
depend on the correlation between rp and q. As correlation 
between rp and q increases, imports and the optimal hedge 
ratio increase. 
Now examine the effects of introducing a commodity 
futures and a currency forward markets directly into Korea. If 
we compare equation (5.16) with (5.26) 
• [1 -.C-
where m'' represents the optimal amount of import in the case 
of introducing a commodity futures and currency forward market 
directly into Korea. Because the denominator (l~Prpq^~Prpr^) < 1, 
mVm" is greater than 1. That is, the optimal quantity of 
import is greater when introducing a commodity futures and 
currency forward market directly into Korea than under without 
both hedging instruments. 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter examined the behavior of an importing 
offshore firm which faces input price and exchange rate 
uncertainties when it has access to U.S. commodity futures 
markets and its own currency forward markets. We find that the 
demand for input M is determined by the stochastic and 
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nonstochastic prices and risk attitudes, and the separation 
between the production and hedging decisions does not hold due 
to basis risk. The firm considers exchange rate uncertainty in 
the optimal commodity hedge because exchange rate uncertainty 
affects the commodity hedge. The firm sets its optimal foreign 
exchange rate hedge equal to its commodity hedge in foreign 
currency plus a factor to account for the unhedged risk of 
foreign sales due to basis risk. 
In examining the effect of introducing a futures market 
and a forward market to the offshore country, there are three 
results; First, introducing only an exchange rate forward 
market to the offshore country makes the offshore firm 
increase its production by increasing imports since the 
exchange rate uncertainty is partially hedged. Secondly, 
introducing both hedging markets to the offshore country also 
encourages the offshore firm to increase its production by 
increasing imports since commodity price and exchange rate 
uncertainties are hedged. Finally, the firm's production with 
two hedging markets is larger than the case with only a 
currency forward market. Also when commodity futures markets 
are directly made in Korea, the hedging role of the futures 
market is still effective. 
This chapter is important because if the offshore firm 
uses U.S. commodity futures markets, it can increases its 
production and profits by increasing imports with less 
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uncertainties. This of course assumes that the firm is a small 
player in the domestic market and will not affect the price of 
the product. Thus this analysis is clearly partial 
equilibrium. This study also develops a hedging strategy 
appropriate for importers. In next chapter, this model will be 
used for emprical work. 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we empirically consider the optimal 
hedging strategies of a Korean grain importing firm using the 
model developed in Chapter 5. Although the model of the 
importing offshore firm in Chapter 5 can be applied to many 
products including oil, metals and lumber, we choose 
agricultural products such as corn, soybean, and wheat which 
are used as inputs because they have severe price fluctuations 
relative to industrial products due to production uncertainty. 
The grain importing firm's concern is how to import grain with 
less price uncertainty because with small domestic production 
the international uncertainty in these prices severely affects 
the risk position of the firm. 
In the empirical application, we consider a Korean corn 
importing firm which also feeds livestock. This firm could be 
a large integrated firm (i.e., Samsung), or a cooperative such 
as the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation or the 
Korean Feed Association. In either case the firm is assumed to 
purchase feed for use as an input in production. The 
cooperative is assumed to act as a vertically integrated firm. 
Suppose this firm commits itself in the current period to 
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producing livestock for the next period, and this production 
requires the imported feed as an input. The foreign currency 
price of the grain is random, so there is risk. 
When the firm commits itself in current period to 
producing final goods for the next period, it can buy a three 
month maturity futures contract in order to hedge the input 
price risk. Since corn is the most important imported feed 
grain the analysis will focus on corn imports and futures 
trading. 
Corn imports are controlled by the government in Korea by 
using an import quota. Since 1984, individual feed mills and 
the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation as well as the 
Korean Feed Association have been authorized to import feed 
corn. Korea's livestock economy is directly related to the 
import corn. The importing companies ( for example, Samsung 
overseas funding company) have a union for grain importing. 
The union helps make the decision on the import quota. Once 
the quota is allocated, the individual firm tries to purchase 
corn as cheaply as possible. The firms market corn in Korea, 
or use it directly for livestock production. The union and the 
government does not set the margins of these importing 
companies for corn sales. According to the Korean Rural 
Economics Institutes and Department of Korean Government 
(Department of Agricultural, Forestry, and Fishery), it might 
be possible for these importing companies to collude each 
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other in setting prices. However, there are many importing 
companies and import quota is very flexible. So we assume the 
current market is perfect competition. 
In Korea the NACF (National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation), as the government buying agent, purchases all 
corn offered by farmers, selling the great bulk of it to feed 
mills and the rest to companies of the Korean Corn Processors 
Association. Feed manufacturers are forced to buy domestic 
corn from the NACF at its cost of acquisition and handling, 
which continues to be several times greater than the import 
price. Thus firms will purchase as much corn as possible on 
the international market and domestic production is not an 
important consideration. 
Following Goodwin, Grennes and Wohlgenant, "international 
grain trade is highly organized and shipments may flow through 
several agents before reaching end-users. A large percentage 
(85%-90%) of U.S. grain exports are handled by five companies; 
Cargill, Continental, Bunge and Born, Louis Dreyfus, and Andre 
Garnac (Davies). These companies conduct marketing and 
arbitrage activities as they arrange the exchange of grain and 
oilseed commodities between domestic producers and foreign 
end-users." If a Korean importing firm must buy corn in the 
U.S., it may face oligopoly in import market. However, the 
Korean importing firm can also buy grain in Argentina, China, 
Thiland, South Africa, France, Canada and other countries. 
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Because of that the market is almost perfectly competitive. 
So, we will consider grain market as a competitive market. 
The period studied is 1980-1990 and midmonth closing 
prices (f) from the Wall Street Journal are used for the 
nearby corn futures contract. The spot prices (p) are the 
monthly U.S. average export price obtained from Feed Situation 
and Outlook Report. The monthly average Korean Won/US dollar 
exchange rate (r) are obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics. There are seasonal fluctuations which 
occur within a year in many agricultural products because they 
are primarily related to seasonal factors, such as the 
weather. Many economists try to remove this seasonality. 
Pierce (1980) argues that they do because 
our ability to recognise, interpret, or react to 
important nonseasonal movements in a series (such as turning 
points and other cyclical events, emerging patterns, or 
unexpected occurrences for which possible cause are sought) is 
hindered by the presence of seasonal movements. 
However, seasonality may be valuable information in commodity 
hedging strategy because seasonality gives regular variation 
in price series. So there is no strong reason to remove 
seasonality in grain product hedging strategy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the optimal 
commodity and currency hedge ratios derived in Chapter 5 and 
the effects of introducing futures markets for a Korean grain 
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importing firm. 
The optimal commodity hedge ratio is 
_ N/^ (rp) [prprf-PzprPrfr^ 
M* v'var (rf) [1 - p^ f^ ] 
2 , (6.1) 
where M* = optimal amount of the commodity to be imported. 
Z* = optimal amount of the commodity sold (if Z > 0) or 
purchased (if Z < 0) in the commodity futures market. 
The optimal currency hedge ratio is 
X *  _  Z *  ^  ) / v a r  ( i p )  [ p p -  p j p j ]  2 ) 
FM* M* F y/^ir) [1 - plfr] 
where X* = optimal amount of foreign exchange purchased 
(if X < 0) in the currency forward market. 
The effects of introducing futures markets are 
e M 
M" 1 - P%r 
[1 - Prfr] 
^ "Prprf ~ Prpr" Prfr"*" 2 Prprf Prpr Prfr^ 
_ [1 ~Pxpr~ Prfr PrprPrifrJ 
^ "Prprf ~Prpr~Prfr 2 Prprf Prpr Pr/r^ 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
where M® = optimal amount of the commodity to be imported in 
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the only existence of the exchange rate forward market. 
M" = optimal amount of import in the absence of the 
commodity futures market and the currency forward market. 
M** = optimal amount of import when both hedging markets exist. 
So, we need the variance, covariance and correlation 
coefficients from the data set obtained to estimate the above 
equations. 
In theoretical model, when the decision maker solves the 
model, the solution of the decision variables will be a 
function of population parameters which are assumed to be 
known. However, in empirical applications, because these 
population parameters are actually unknown to the decision 
maker, these are simply replaced by the sample parameter 
estimates. This leads to an additional source of uncertainty, 
called estimation risk (Chalfant, Collender and Subramanian). 
So, because of the existence of this estimation risk, the 
estimation results in this empirical part must be interpretted 
with caution. 
6.2. Unit root test 
When the time series under investigation are stationary, 
they have a clear meaning. If the series under investigation 
are nonstationary, the usual distributional results and tests 
of significance are no longer valid. Engle and Granger (1987) 
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show that since nonstationary variables have infinite 
variances that make the F-tests or t-tests invalid, standard 
hypothesis testing does not apply to time series with unit 
roots. First of all, we need test whether a series is 
stationary. Dickey and Fuller (1979) have developed unit root 
tests which provide an easy method of testing whether a series 
is nonstationary. The rejection of the unit root hypothesis 
provides the necessary condition to conclude that a series is 
stationary, but not a sufficient condition. If a series has 
a stationary, invertible ARMA representation after first 
differencing, it is said to be integrated of order 1, i.e., 
Xj — 1(1). A stationary series is denoted by an 1(0) series. 
1(d) represents that a series needs to be differenced d times 
to become stationary. The order of integration can be inferred 
by testing for unit roots. 
Let's consider a time series (X^) which is difference 
stationary, 
X; = a + b Xj., + e^  (6.6) 
If |b| < 1, then X^ is said to be stationary. If b = 1, X^ is 
difference-stationary. The usual t-statistic for testing the 
null hypothesis that b is equal to one is not valid here. 
Therefore, we can reparameterize equation (6.6) and (6.7) by 
subtracting X^., on both sides of equation (6.6). 
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AX^ = a + (b-1) Xj., + (6.7) 
where A = (1-L), L is the lag operator. 
One can estimate the equation (6.7) with OLS and compare the 
t-statistic on the coefficient of X^., with the critical value 
r provided in Fuller (1976, p 373). This procedure is called 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test and valid when e^ is a white noise 
process (serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic disturbance). 
This assumes that the first order autoregressive model is 
correct. A simple way to account for the serial correlation is 
to write equation (6.7) as 
n 
LXf. - a + (jb-l)J?t.i + V (6.8) 
1-1 
and n is selected to be large enough to ensure that the 
residuals e^ are white noise. One can estimate equation (6.8) 
with OLS and compare the t-statistic on the coefficient of X^ .^  
with the same critical value provided in Fuller. This 
procedure is called the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test. The 
ADF tests examine 
Hg : b = 1, the null hypothesis of unit root process against 
H., ; b < 1. The rejection if implies that the series X^ is 
stationary. 
Table 1 reports the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests 
for the stationarity of the exchange rate (r), futures price 
(f), spot price (rp) and futures price (rf) in terms of a 
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Korean Won. The null hypothesis that there is a unit root can 
be accepted at the 95% confidence level if the r-statistic 
falls below 2.89 in absolute value for a sample of 100 
observations. From table 1 it can be seen that all the price 
series follow a process with a unit root. In this paper, if a 
unit root was found then series was differenced and the 
differenced series was tested again for a second unit root. 
The results are given in table 2. It is apparent that the 
hypothesis that the first-order differences of the prices is 
1(1) is rejected significantly and, therefore, all the prices 
are integrated of the first order; that is, 1(1). 
Standard unit root tests routinely fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root for many economic time series. 
Because in emprical work the unit root is the null hypothesis 
to be tested, and the way in which classical hypothesis 
testing is carried out, the standard procedure ensures that 
the null hypothesis is accepted unless there is strong 
evidence against it (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin 
(KPSS)). Therefore, KPSS suggest that, in trying to decide by 
classical methods whether economic data are stationary or 
integrated, it would be useful to perform tests of the null 
hypothesis of stationary as well as tests of the null 
hypothesis of a unit 
root. They provide a test of the null hypothesis of stationary 
against the alternative of a unit root. Let's introduce the 
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Table 1. Test for unit roots in f, r, rp and rf 
Pseudo t-statistics 
ADF specification (T 
f 
r 
rp 
rf 
Table 2. 1(1) test 
Pseudo t-statistics 
ADF specification (T 
f 
r 
rp 
rf 
= 129) 
-2.0179 
-2.1183 
-2.2281 
-2.3522 
= 126) 
—7.4415 
-3.7081 
-6.695 
-7.4531 
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KPSS's method. Let y^, t=l,2,3,...T, be the observed series 
for which we wish to test stationary. They assume that they 
can decompose the series into the sum of a deterministic 
trend, a random walk, and a stationary error; 
y, = at + r^ + (6.9) 
Here r^ = r^.^ + u^, where, the u^ are iid(0, a J) . The initial 
value rg is treated as fixed and serves the role of an 
intercept. The stationarity hypothesis is simply = 0. 
Since is assumed to be stationary, under the null 
hypothesis y^ is stationary around a level (r^) rather than 
around a trend. 
Let e^, t=l,2,3,....T, be the residuals from the 
regression of y on an intercept and time trend. Let be the 
estimate of the error variance from this regression (the sum 
of squared residuals, divided by T). Define the partial sum 
process of the residuals: 
t 
Sf. - ^ ©i / C-1, 2 / . . . T. 
i-l 
Then the LM (Lagrangean multiplier) statistic is 
T 
LM - ^t/àl (6.10) 
c-i 
Furthermore, in the event of the null hypothesis of level 
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stationary instead of trend stationarity, e^ is the residual 
from the regression of y on intercept only. The test is an 
upper tail test. However, the series to which the stationary 
test will be applied are typically highly dependent over time, 
and so the iid error assumption under the null is unrealistic. 
To allow for quite general forms of temporal dependence, they 
define the long-run variance as 
o2 - lim^ .^ T-^E{sl) 
which will enter into the asymptotic distribution of the test 
statistic. A consistent estimator of a^, say s^(l) , can be 
constructed from the residuals e^, 
s2(J) - + 2T-^Y^W{S,1) Y) 
t-1 3-1 t-S+1 
Here, w(s,l) is an optimal weighting function that corresponds 
to the choice of a special window. They use the Bartlett 
window w(s,l)=l-s/(1+1). For consistency of s^(l), it is 
necessary that the lag truncation parameter 1 as T -»• <». 
So, when the errors are not iid, the appropriate denominator 
of the test statistic is an estimate of instead of The 
numerator of the test statistic is 
n = T'2 Z s/ 
100 
Then the test statistic is 
% -
- T-^ Yt Sl/s^{l) 
where n represents the level stationary and r represents the 
trend stationary. 
Table 3 represents the upper tail critical values for 
level and trend stationarity. Now we apply KPSS's method for 
the stationarity test to the data of f, r, rf, rp. In table 4, 
we present the t?^ test statistic for the null hypothesis of 
stationarity around a level, and the test statistic for the 
null hypothesis of stationarity around a deterministic linear 
trend. We can reject the null hypothesis of level or trend 
stationary at usual critical levels for all series. This means 
that all series may be nonstationary. Since this KPSS test is 
intended to complement unit root tests, such as the Dickey-
Fuller tests, by testing the null hypothesis of both the unit 
root (Dickey-Fuller method) and the stationarity (KPSS 
method), use of both helps confirm whether the series is 
stationary or not. Because in ADF test, all series fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of unit root, and in KPSS test, all 
series reject the null hypothesis of stationary, we can say 
that all series are non-stationary. 
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Table 3. Upper tail critical values for and 
: Upper tail percentiles of the level stationarity 
Critical level: 0.10 0.05 0.025 0.01 
Critical value: 0.347 0.463 0.574 0.739 
: Upper tail percentiles of the trend stationarity 
Critical level: 0.10 0.05 0.025 0.01 
Critical value: 0.119 0.146 0.176 0.216 
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Table 4. r] and r]^ tests for stationarity applied to 
r, rp, rf. 
Lag truncation parameter (1) 
Series 12 3 4 
For level stationarity (Hp) 
f 1.59120 0.98346 0. 72470 0.58256 
r 1.20836 0.73444 0. 53180 0.41970 
rp 0.94258 0.58604 0. 43500 0.35238 
rf 1.18340 0.73892 0. 55018 0.44666 
For trend stationarity (%) 
f 0.29635 0.18575 0. 13923 0.11424 
r 1.01543 0.61625 0. 44559 0.35119 
rp 0.41708 0.26132 0. 19570 0.16018 
rf 0.32433 0.20519 0. 15516 0.12827 
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6.3. Estimation 
Because all series have a unit root, the problem is to 
obtain the correct variance and covariance. If we difference 
the series, the differenced series are stationary, but those 
series can not appropriately represent the original series 
because the unconditional variances are different. The way to 
solve that problem is to use the conditional mean, variance 
and covariance. In Myers and Thompson (1989), they consider 
conditional moments that depend on information available at 
the time the hedging decision is made when they get the 
optimal hedge ratio. They assume that spot and futures prices 
for a commodity are generated by the following linear 
equation; 
Pt = Ifi a + u, 
ft = Ifi f + v, 
where 1^., is a vector of variables known at t-1 that help 
predict p^ and f^. Examples of variables that might appear in 
1^., are lagged values of spot and futures prices, production, 
storage, exports, and consumer income all dated t-1 and 
earlier. By applying the conditional (on 1^.,) covariance 
operator to above equation, it is found that 
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a} = var(ujl,.,) 
= var(vjl^.,), and 
Sf = cov(Ut,vJlt.i). 
The problem has been reduced to one of obtaining an estimate 
of $. 
$ - — n'n u^ vl 
v'xx v'-\\ 
Optimal hedge ratio - v'u 
v'v 
However, their method of obtaining optimal hedge ratio may not 
be applicable in international market because optimal hedge 
ratio is not a simple ratio between covariance and variance of 
futures and spot price, but a series is multiplied by an 
exchange rate. 
By Fama's definition, a "market is efficient" if new 
information is fully and timely reflected in price. That is, 
market prices adjust to new information rapidly and completely 
and that these adjustments are, on average, correct so that 
the adjusted prices are market clearing. If we follow the 
market efficiency hypothesis, information conditional on its 
own past value may be the most valuable and the price series 
itself may include all relevant information revealed. So we 
use the AR(1) model in order to obtain variance and covarance 
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of the price series under the conditional information set. 
Let Xj be the related time series which is nonstationary. 
can be represented by the Autoregressive process (AR(1)). 
Since X^ is nonstationary, the variance of X^ is infinite. Also 
we can not estimate p correctly because X^ and X^., are 
nonstationary. So we need to use a first difference. 
Since (X^ - Xj.^) and (X^.^ - X^.g) are stationary, we can 
correctly estimate /3. However, var(X^-X^.^) is not the same as 
var(X^) because var(X^-X^.,) = var(X^) + var(X^.,) - 2cov(X^,X^.^) 
* var(XJ . Because of that we can not use the unconditional 
variance of the differenced series. Instead of that we use the 
conditional variance of the differenced series because 
var^., (X^-Xj.^) = var^.^(X^). Here var^.^ represents the conditional 
variance which depends upon the information available at time 
t-1. Rearranging equation (6.12) 
X^  = a + /3 X^ ., + e* (6.11) 
X, - X,., = g (X,., - X,.j) + (e, - e,.,) (6.12) 
^t-1 ^ (^t-1 " ^t-2^ ®t ~ ®t-1 (6.13) 
If we take a conditional expectation of equation (6.13), 
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Efi Xt = X^., + /3 (X^., - X,.2) - e,., (6.14) 
where is the conditional expectation which depends on 
information available at time t-1. 
To get conditional variance we use 
Xt - X, = e, (6.15) 
Here, var^.^(e^) is finite and represents the conditional 
variance of the original series. If we consider another two 
series and Z^, then we can get following by using the same 
procedure; 
Yt - E,., Y, = n, (6.16) 
(6.17) 
From equation (6.15), (6.16) and (6.17) we can get the 
conditional variance and covariance matrix (n) of the shock e^ 
and n^. 
ê'ê ê'ù ê'i) 
Ù . 1 T û'ê ù'û 
(Ko 
where e, n and v are vectors of residuals from estimating 
equation (6.15), (6.16) and (6.17), respectively, and T is the 
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number of observation. The conditional mean and variance for 
f, r, rf and rp are reported in Table 5. The means and 
standard deviations of the unanticipated changes in f, r, rf 
and rp are presented in Table 6. Estimating equation (6.18) 
gives Tables 7 and 8 which present the covariance and 
correlations among the unanticipated changes for f, r, rf and 
rp. If we apply values in Table 5, 6, 7 and 8 to equations 
(6.1), (6.2), (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), we can following 
results: 
II . - [Prprf- PrprPrfrJ _ -0.67232 (6.1'] 
M* yvar (rf) [l -
_X^  - II + ^ . -0.61 (6.2') 
FM* M* F Vvar (Z) [1 - Prfr] 
[1 - Prfr] 
^ "Prprf ~ Prpr ~ Prfr"*" 2 Prprf Prpr Prfr^ 
_ [1 ~Prpr~ Prfz* Prpr PrfrJ 
^ "Prprf "Prpr "Prfr"*" 2 Prprf Prpr Prfx^ 
- 2.848 (6.4') 
- 2.8148 (6.5') 
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In order to get the optimal currency hedge ratio in equation 
(6.2'), we need to assume that the commodity futures markets 
are unbiased (E^.^ = F) . However, since series is 
nonstationary, we must get a conditional mean (E^., = F = 
2.6646). 
Equation (6.1') represents the optimal commodity hedge 
ratio (-0.67) which is an underhedge because basis risk and 
exchange rate risk is reflected. Equation (6.2') is the 
optimal currency hedge ratio (-0.61) which is not a perpect 
hedge. So when the firm imports corn in the U.S. commodity 
market, it also buys 67.2% of corn in the U.S. corn futures 
market and also buys 61% of currency (U.S. $) among its value 
(FM*) in the currency forward market. Equation (6.1') shows 
that when a Korean importing firm uses U.S. commodity futures 
market, as conditional correlation between rp and rf is 
higher, the optimal commodity hedge ratio increases because 
the correlation between rp and rf is positive. 
In equation (6.3') the optimal quantity of import under 
the existence of only a currency foirward market is 1.012 times 
greater than under without any hedging instruments. Equation 
(6.4') shows that the import can be increased 2.848 times when 
the Korean firm uses both hedging markets. Equation (6.5') 
shows that the optimal amount of import under the existence of 
both hedging instruments is 2.81 times greater than under the 
existence of only a currency forward hedging instrument. That 
109 
Table 5. Conditional mean and variance for f, r, rf and rp 
f r rf rp 
Mean 2.6646 757.31 1996.7 2157.6 
Variance 0.064 18.025 19237 13373 
Table 6. Summary of means and other 
unanticipated changes in f, 
statistics 
r, rf and 
Of 
rp 
the 
ef er erf erp 
Mean -0.0015674 0.25676 0.03025 0.37329 
Variance 0.064 18.025 19237 13373 
Minimum -0.62122 -12.765 -485.27 -448.18 
Maximum 1.2176 20.07 644.57 542.06 
where er = r - E^.^r = unanticipated changes in r 
erf = rf - E^.^rf = unanticipated changes in rf 
erp = rp - E^.,rp = unanticipated changes in rp 
ef = f - E^.^f = unanticipated changes in f 
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Table 7. Correlation matrix of variables 
er 1.000 
erf 0.14136 1.000 
erp 0.10788 0.80551 1.000 
ef 0.02657 0.68953 0.58399 1.000 
er erf erp ef 
Table 8. Covariance matrix of variables 
er 18.025 
erf 83.235 19237 
erp 52.966 12920 13373 
ef 0.02854 24.194 17.085 0.064 
er erf erp ef 
where er = r -
•1^ = unanticipated changes in r 
erf = rf - Ef ^rf = unanticipated changes in rf 
erp = rp - Ef ,rp = unanticipated changes in rp 
(D H)
 
II M>
 
= unanticipated changes in f 
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means, the introduction of the currency forward market without 
introducing the commodity futures market has little hedging 
effect in commodity trading (import) in Korea. If a Korean 
grain importing firm uses the U.S. futures markets, it can 
reduce inefficiencies caused by unstable prices and increase 
the amount of import, and on the other hand the U.S. firm can 
increase its export. So, two country's trade may be enhanced. 
Alternatively the Korean government could help domestic 
traders by entering into futures contracts in Chicago on 
behalf of domestic traders. However, given the size of the 
firms included, this is probably not warranted. 
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Increased trading activities and expanding markets in 
recent years and related economic or political shocks have 
created higher and more volitile prices resulting in greater 
uncertainty in decision making. Since the break down of the 
fixed exchange rate regime in the early 1970s, foreign 
exchange rates have fluctuated wildly. So exchange rate risk 
has become an important issue for management of firms with 
international transactions. This environment has led to an 
increased interest in the use of futures markets, and 
commodity and currency futures markets have rapidly developed 
and been actively utilized in recent years as a way of 
efficiently coping with exchange rate and price risks. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the 
competitive firm's behavior under the price and exchange rate 
uncertainty when the firm participates in futures markets to 
hedge against these risks. This dissertation deals with three 
theoretical models which consider three different firms, and 
one empirical study. In two of the theoretical models, four 
possible cases are considered according to the trade 
restrictions. 
In the first model, when Qp and are unrestricted, the 
production decision does not depend on the risk attitudes or 
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probability distribution of the random variables. That is, the 
separation theorem holds. However, marketing decisions (and 
the hedging decision) are affected by uncertainty even though 
there are hedging instruments. Whether the firm exports or 
imports depends on the relative prices between the expected 
net foreign price (ENFP) and the certain futures price (F); 
i) If ENFP » F, the firm exports and optimal hedge Z = -Qp + 
Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p), ii) If ENFP > F (not very large), Z = Qp + 
QpCov(rs,p)/var(p), iii) If ENFP < F, the firm imports and 
Z = Qg - Qp cov(rs,p)/var(p) . When the commodity or currency 
futures price is biased, the firm underhedges under normal 
backwardation and overhedges under contango. 
In restricted model, if Qp = 0, the separation theorem 
still holds, but if Q^ = 0, separation does not hold because 
firm 's production is based on the foreign market conditions 
with uncertainty. If Q^ = Qp = 0, the firm does not produce and 
participate in the futures market as a speculator. 
When futures markets are newly introduced to the market, 
production increases since the producer (or hedger) can make a 
production decision with certainty by using futures markets. 
If basis risk in commodity futures market is introduced to the 
complete market model, the production and hedging decision are 
not. separated, and the production and marketing (and hedging) 
decisions are affected by uncertainty. 
In the second theoretical model, the firm can export or 
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import forward and supply or purchase output in the domestic 
market under price and exchange rate uncertainties and basis 
risk. In the unrestricted case, the production and hedging 
decisions are separated even though basis risk exists. The 
firm fully hedges in the currency market, but does not fully 
hedge in commodity market due to basis risk. If Ep > (Rpp -
k), then a short position is taken in futures and a shot spot 
position is taken in the domestic market. If Ep = (Rp^-k), the 
firm does not use the futures market. If Ep < (Rpp - k), a 
long position is taken in futures and a long spot position is 
taken in the domestic market. In a restricted case, if Qp = 0, 
the separation theorem does not hold, the production and 
marketing (and hedging) decision is affected by uncertainty, 
and the optimal hedge ratio (Z/Q) = cov(p,f)/var(f), which is 
not a full hedge. If Qp = 0, the separation theorem holds only 
under specific conditions; Ep < (Rpp - F), and the firm fully 
hedges in the foreign exchange market. 
In the third theoretical model in Chapter 5, the 
importing offshore firm faces input price and exchange rate 
uncertainties when it has access to U.S. commodity futures 
markets and its own currency forward markets. The separation 
between the production and hedging decision does not hold due 
to basis risk, and the demand for input M is determined by the 
stochastic and nonstochastic prices and risk attitudes. The 
firm considers exchange rate uncertainty in the optimal 
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commodity hedge because exchange rate uncertainty affects the 
commodity hedge. The firm set its optimal foreign exchange 
rate hedge equal to its commodity hedge in the foreign 
currency plus a factor to account for the unhedged risk of 
foreign sales due to a basis risk. Introducing both hedging 
markets to the offshore country makes the offshore firm 
increase its production by increasing imports since the 
production function is concave, and commodity price and 
exchange rate uncertainties are hedged. 
In the empirical study, the optimal commodity and 
currency hedge ratios and the effect of introducing futures 
markets are estimated for a Korean grain importing firm. In 
the estimation problem, the time series are investigated as to 
whether they are stationary or not using the Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) method which tests the null hypothesis of unit root, and 
KPSS method which tests the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
Because in the DF test, all series fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root and in KPSS test all series reject to 
the null hypothesis of stationarity, we can say that all 
series are non-stationary. So we use the conditional moments 
method in order to correctly obtain more information and to 
solve the non-stationary problem. 
The results show that optimal commodity and currency 
hedges are underhedges because risk is not completely hedged. 
When a Korean importing firm uses the U.S. commodity futures 
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markets, as conditional correlation between rp and rf is 
higher, the optimal commodity hedge ratio increases, ^ en the 
Korean importing firm uses both hedging markets, the import 
can be increased 2.848 times. The introduction of the currency 
forward market without introducing the commodity futures 
market is not very effective for commodity trading hedges in 
Korea. If a Korean firm uses the U.S. futures markets, the 
Korean firm can reduce inefficiencies caused by unstable 
prices and increase the amount of import, and on the other 
hand a U.S. firm can increase its export. Therefore, both two 
country's trade could be enhanced. 
The first and second models provide some insight into the 
risk shifting role of futures markets and marketing strategy 
when the both hedging markets are available. The third 
theoretical model develops a hedging strategy appropriate for 
importers using offshore futures markets. The empirical study 
directly estimates optimal hedges. 
Limitations of this dissertation must be recognized. If 
uncertainties in production (in Chapter 3 and 4) and domestic 
prices of final goods (in Chapter 5) are introduced, the 
optimality conditions should be modified and would be much 
more complicated. If estimation risk in empirical study is 
corrected, the empirical results will be more precise. 
Sometimes in the market environment an oligopolistic market 
model instead of a competitive market model may be reasonable 
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to explain real world. So the oligopolistic market model 
should be examined in future research. 
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Figure 1. Import price of corn (in terms of Won) 
124 
125 
126 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
0.5 
80 84 86 88 90 
81 83 85 87 89 
Figure 4. Com nearby futures price 
Won (futures price * exchange rate) 
(Thousands) 
